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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the issue of global divide on homosexuality in the 
contemporary world, to determine the main predictors of homonegativity and to understand how 
societal attitudes towards homosexuality change. A brief historical excursion from pre Christian era 
to modern days was conducted to observe how societal attitudes towards homosexuality were 
changed several times throughout history. I derived several theories from social psychology to 
explain this attitude change, the most important of which was expertise heuristics. Taking into 
account historical patterns and theoretical background, we conducted empirical cross-country and 
multiple regression analysis based on the global data from more than 100 countries.  
I discovered that religion and religiosity are one of the main factors which contribute to 
homonegativity by shaping personal attitudes and societal values. The mechanism of religious 
influence could be explained by the expertise heuristics effect. This effect means that persons derive 
their attitudes from the experts‘ statements and judgements. Thus, confidence in authorities matters. 
In case of religion, more confidence in religious institutions a particular person has, more these 
institutions and their propaganda affect attitudes and opinions of this person. Applying this to 
attitudes towards homosexuality, greater confidence in religious institutions contributes to more 
homonegativity. However, the negative effect of religion differs for different religious 
denominations. I discovered that Islam is the most homonegative of all religious denominations 
while Protestantism is the least homonegative one.  
The main finding is that religion shapes attitudes towards homosexuality through 
homonegative propaganda by its institutions which influence societal attitudes and values. The 
possible way to value change is secularization and decrease of the role of religious institutions in 
society. These findings are supported by historical patterns and by empirical results. 
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1. Introduction: General Overview  
 
The issue of homosexuality, gay rights and same-sex marriages divides the contemporary 
world in halves. While Western and Anglo-Saxon countries (Western Europe, North America and 
Latin America, New Zealand) more or less accepted homosexuality, legalized same-sex marriages 
(or at least same-sex partnerships) and offered to gay people some protection from discrimination in 
their laws, other half of the world, including Eastern Europe and Russia, Asia and Africa, still does 
not recognize and protect gay rights. Moreover, in many of these countries, mostly Muslim 
countries with sharia law, being a homosexual is serious crime for which people could be sentenced 
to jail or even to death.
1
 There are more than 76 countries in modern world when homosexuality is 
still illegal, as is reported by the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex 
Association (ILGA).
2
 ILGA also provided the list of 10 nations which have a death penalty for 
homosexuals in their laws. 
3
In some of these countries as Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and Nigeria, such 
laws are implemented into the criminal code of these countries but no actual executions have been 
reported.
4
In other nations, as Iraq, there is no such law in the book, but executions of homosexuals 
are carried out by militaries and religion leaders.
5
The worst situation with gay rights is probably in 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, the might Eastern powers, where death penalty for homosexuals is 
implemented into the law and executions of gay people are carried out on the regular basis.
6
 
In most of the Eastern European countries same-sex marriages still do not have any legal 
recognition, or even constitutional ban on same-sex marriages is implemented in some countries. 
Even in such countries as Czech Republic or Slovenia, where gay marriages have a legal 
recognition, they are accepted as civil unions and not as full marriages.
7 8
 In some countries 
additional anti-gay laws were implemented. For example, Russia in 2013 passed so-called ―gay 
propaganda law‖ which banned any positive or neutral (but not homonegative!) mentions of 
homosexuality in public in order to ―protect children from harm‖, as a second amendment to the 
Federal Law of Russian Federation ―On Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their 
Health and Development‖9. 
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From this picture, we could observe that modern world is intensely divided when it comes to 
gay rights and same-sex marriages. Currently, there are 23 countries in the modern world (mostly in 
Europe and Americas, with a slight exception of South Africa) which gave a full recognition to the 
same-sex marriages, according to the report of Pew Research Center
10
. In other countries, as was 
noted above, the legal recognition of the same-sex marriages differs from partial recognition to 
criminal punishment for homosexual relations and even death sentence. Therefore, an important 
question arises: why contemporary world is so divided on this issue? Why some nations and 
countries granted same-sex couples with full legal recognition, while others continue to persecute 
and kill homosexuals?  
To answer this question, a detailed research is required. The aim of this research is to catch 
up the main historical, cultural, social and political features of this issue, to build up a theoretical 
model and then to test it with empirical data from The World Values Survey. Before proceeding to 
that, some additional preliminary notes are required however. It is worth to note, that a little more 
than fifty years ago, the situation with gay rights in Western world was not any better than in the 
other parts of the world now. In most of the European countries, for example, the homosexual 
activity itself was illegal until the second half of 20st century according to ILGA world 
survey.
11
Even if in such countries as Belgium and France homosexual activity was legal since 
1795
12
(we will return to these examples later), there were no legal recognition for homosexual 
relations even in those countries. However, Netherlands legalize same-sex marriage in 2001, thus 
becoming the first country in the world to recognize homosexual marriage.
13
After that, spillover 
effect has followed, and by now 23 countries of the world recognize same-sex marriages, and some 
other countries have a partial recognition of a legal status of same-sex relationships. This rapid 
progress in accepting homosexuality and recognition of same-sex marriages was made during the 
last fifteen years. Before that, situation with gay rights was much worse even in the Western 
countries. In addition, it is worth to note that not only Western governments recognize same-sex 
marriages, but the public opinion about acceptance of homosexuality has also been drastically 
changed in these countries. According to the Pew Research Center report in 2013, the majority of 
population in Western Europe and North America accept homosexuality.
14
In addition, in their 
report PRC have shown a percentage change in public opinion on acceptance of homosexuality, and 
in most of the Western European and North American countries presented in their report (with a 
slight exception of France, where public opinion on homosexuality changed in negative way during 
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the last 6 years), this change is towards the acceptance of homosexuality.
15
Therefore, we can 
conclude that the societal views towards homosexuality were also drastically changed to the 
positive in most of these societies and the legal recognition of gay rights and same-sex marriages 
came along with the public acceptance of homosexuality. 
However, the rest of the world has not being as strong in terms of acceptance of gay rights. 
As PRC reported, ―publics in Africa and in predominantly Muslim countries remain among the least 
accepting of homosexuality. In sub-Saharan Africa, at least nine-in-ten in Nigeria (98%), Senegal 
(96%), Ghana (96%), Uganda (96%) and Kenya (90%) believe homosexuality should not be 
accepted by society. Even in South Africa where, unlike in many other African countries, 
homosexual acts are legal and discrimination based on sexual orientation is unconstitutional, 61% 
say homosexuality should not be accepted by society, while just 32% say it should be 
accepted.‖16Russia remains the least accepting homosexuality country in Europe (74% of Russian 
population believe that homosexuality should not be accepted by society).
17
 
To conclude this chapter, it is worth to note that contemporary world is greatly divided on 
homosexuality issue – from the full acceptance and legal recognition, as in some Western countries, 
to the full rejection and legal persecution up to death sentence, as in some Middle Eastern countries. 
Therefore, the question of global divide on homosexuality arises again. Why some nations in the 
world changed their attitude towards homosexuality drastically during the last decades and came to 
acceptance of gay relations and same-sex marriages, while others persist to reject homosexuality 
and to persecute gay people? To answer this question, a brief historical review is required. To 
understand the contemporary global divide on homosexuality, we need to know how attitudes 
towards homosexuality were changing from the beginning of time.  
From historical review, we will proceed to a literature review where we will investigate 
which research had been already done on the homosexuality issue and how could it explain the 
historical pattern which we will derive from historical review. Then, we will explore theories from 
social psychology what could help us to understand better how the societal values and attitudes 
towards homosexuality actually change and which possible mechanisms lie behind it. Finally, we 
will present our empirical models and analysis where we will test our hypotheses about 
homonegativity and main factors which cause it. Finally, we will conclude.  
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2. Historical Overview 
2.1. Homosexuality in the Ancient World 
 
Although the world ―homosexuality‖ is relatively new (the concept of homosexuality was 
first written by German writer Karl Heinrich Ulrichs in 1864, who now considered a pioneer of the 
gay rights movement, and the term ―homosexual‖ was first coined by the Hungarian journalist 
Karoly Maria Kertbeny (born Karl-Maria Benkert) in 1869)
18
, homosexuality itself is as old as 
humanity. The first officially registered records of homosexuality date back to a pre-history, 
Mesolithic era: depictions of male intercourse were found in Mesolithic rock art in Sicily and date 
back to 9660 BCE.
19
In addition, drawings and sexual depictions of the Neolithic and Bronze Age, 
like human figures of a ―third sex‖ (e.g., with female breast and male genitals) were discovered, for 
example, in Neolithic Greece and Cyprus.
20
 
There is mass evidence that homosexuality was widely accepted in the pre Christian era, in 
pagan civilizations
21
, with slight exception of Ancient Egypt, where homosexuality was condemned 
as one of the ―sins‖ in the Book of the Dead (the Egyptian Book of the Dead is a mortuary texts 
collection of Ancient Egypt which was written originally on papyrus and covered with magic spells, 
dating back to the 1650-1550 BCE).
22
Despite its being the first condemnation of homosexuality on 
a religion basis in human history, thus was, however, unique to Egyptian pagan religion and was not 
met in the other ones.
23
 In addition, there was no any mention of legal prescriptions against 
homosexuality in Ancient Egypt.  
However elsewhere in the ancient world homosexuality was generally widely accepted in 
the ancient world and neither ancient kings nor pagan religions found any reason to persecute and 
condemn homosexuals. Thus, male cult homosexual prostitutes were quite popular in Ancient 
Mesopotamia.
24
But the most notable fact is probably that Assyrian men prayed to their gods to 
bless their homosexual love.
25  That was a striking contrast with Christianity where only 
heterosexual marriage is considered to be divinely blessed.  
However, the most remarkable example of homosexuality acceptance in the ancient world is 
probably Ancient Greece. Thus, the largest amount of material on the history of homosexuality 
comes from the Ancient Greece – from the works of Ancient Greek philosophers and writers such 
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as Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, and even Homer in his famous poems ―Iliad‖ and ―Odyssey‖, from 
theatre plays by Aristophanes, from Greek artworks (e.g., amphora ornamentations, sculptures, 
etc.)
26
Another important issue is that the Ancient Greeks established the whole social institution of 
homosexual relations of paiderastia, which did not replace traditional heterosexual marriage but 
coexisted with it simultaneously.
27
Therefore, we could argue that not only was there no 
condemnation of homosexuality in Ancient Greece, but that homosexual relations, especially in the 
form of paiderastia, were highly accepted by society and even praised if they were practiced by the 
upper-class part of Hellenic society – the aristocracy. 
Evidence of homosexuality acceptance in the pagan world could be found in other 
civilizations as well. For example, wall paintings from one Etruscan tomb in Tarquinia, Italy dating 
back to the 6
th
 century BCE depict homosexual intercourse between two males.
28
In addition, 
Aristotle in his ―Politics‖ mentioned that the Celts openly approved and highly esteemed sexual 
relationships between males.
29
Similarly, Diodorus described that the Celts not only practiced 
homosexual relations in an open way but also disapproved of the Greek paiderastia, because the 
Celts favored ―relationships between the equals and were not concerned with the beauty of young 
age‖30. Therefore, homosexuality was not only widely accepted in the ancient world but even 
special social institutions for homosexual relations, such as the Greek paiderastia, or the Celtic 
―warrior brotherhoods‖ were established. 
 
2.2. Christianity, Islam and the Condemnation of Homosexuality 
 
If homosexuality was so widely accepted in the ancient world, where did its condemnation 
come from? It came together with Judeo-Christian monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam in 
particular. Before exploration of Christian and Islamic ATH (attitudes towards homosexuality), we 
should try to understand what the holy books of those religions – the Bible and the Quran – say 
about homosexuality. Leviticus 18, part of Leviticus, which in turn is a part of the Old Testament, 
officially condemns homosexual men with the penalty of capital punishment.
31
These lines 
unambiguously outlawed homosexual men both in Judaism (which is based on the Old Testament), 
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and Christianity which accepted the Old Testament also in addition to the New. Homosexuality is 
often referred to idolatry in the Bible, which was considered to be ―the mother of all sins‖.32 This 
fact made some scholars claim that in the mind of ancient Jews, the homosexuality was strongly 
associated with paganism, and that their new religion should oppose old pagan cultures with its 
sexual sins.
33
 That does not explain, however, why homosexuality at all should be chosen as a sin, 
because pagans did many other things that were fully accepted in the Bible – for example, 
sacrificing animals to God.
34
 
Another nail in the coffin of homosexuality in Christianity was hammered in by Apostle 
Paul.  The first chapter of the famous Epistle of Paul to the Romans contains passages that many 
Christians and Christian theologians consider as the clearest and most complete evidence of 
condemnation of homosexuality by Christianity.
35
 
In similar fashion to Christianity, we will first investigate what the Quran, the holy book of 
Islam, and the Islamic prophet and creator of Islam Muhammad said about homosexuality. Several 
passages in Quran explicitly condemn homosexuality as a ―sin‖.3637However, no clear punishment 
is determined for homosexuals in the Quran.
38
 However, hadiths by the prophet Muhammad are far 
stricter regarding this issue. For example, passages from hadiths such as the following made it clear 
what should be done to homosexuals: 
                                                          
32
 Exodus 20:2-5 
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33
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 Exodus 29:19-22 
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slaughter the ram, and take some of its blood and put it on the lobe of Aaron's right ear and on the lobes of his sons' 
right ears and on the thumbs of their right hands and on the big toes of their right feet, and sprinkle the rest of the 
blood around on the altar. " 
35
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36
 Al-Araf 80-81  
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from among the worlds?(80)Indeed, you approach men with desire, instead of women. Rather, you are a transgressing 
people."(81)” 
37
 Ash-Shura 25:165-166 
“Do you approach males among the worlds(165).And leave what your Lord has created for you as mates? But you are 
a people transgressing."(166)” 
38
 Quran 4:16 
“And the two who commit it among you, dishonor them both. But if they repent and correct themselves, leave them 
alone. Indeed, Allah is ever Accepting of repentance and Merciful.” 
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―Narrated Abdullah ibn Abbas: The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: If you find 
anyone doing as Lot‘s people did, kill the one who does it, and the one to whom it is 
done.‖39 
―Narrated Abdullah ibn Abbas: If a man who is not married is seized committing 
sodomy, he will be stoned to death.‖40 
 
There are also other hadiths that prescribe exactly the same things to be done to 
homosexuals – to kill both persons engaged in this activity, preferably to stone them to death.41In 
addition, the Quran cited the Bible story of ―people of Lut‖ (who were interpreted to be engaged in 
carnal activities between males) and of the following wrath of God upon Sodom and 
Gomorra.
42
Therefore, the traditional schools of Islamic (Sharia) Law considered homosexuality a 
sin and homosexual acts to be punishable crimes. The punishment for such a ―sexual transgression‖ 
should be the only one possible in Islam, according to the hadiths – a death penalty. 
Therefore, both religions – Islam and Christianity – condemned homosexuality with the 
preferable punishment of the death penalty. These attitudes became actual laws when the Roman 
Empire was converted to Christianity in the 4
th
 century and then when the Arab caliphate arose in 
the 7
th
 century. Thus, in 342, the first anti-gay law was introduced by Roman emperors Constantius 
II and Constans.
43
The situation worsened with the passage of time. In 390 other Roman emperors 
Valentinian II, Theodosius I and Arcadius introduced a death penalty for homosexual men caught 
during sexual intercourse – to burn them alive before the public.44 After the fall of the West Roman 
Empire in the 5
th
 century, this homonegative attitude was inherited by the newborn European 
kingdoms which were converted to Christianity. Thus, the first European secular law against 
homosexuality was implemented in the Visigothic kingdom in 654, with a penalty of 
castration.
45
Other European states followed and the penalty soon became that of death.  
                                                          
39
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are addicted to carnal offences. For we counsel well for the benefit of our people and our country, when we take 
8 
 
The most important thing to remember though that persecution of homosexuals never ceased 
in Europe from the early Middle Ages (7
th
 century, when the first secular laws against 
homosexuality were implemented as mentioned above) to the end of the 18
th
 century. 
 
2.3. First Attempts at the Decriminalization of Homosexuality 
 
 The first attempts of the decriminalization of homosexuality in Europe date back to the 
French revolution, to the end of 18
th
 century, and are attributed by some researchers to the pervasive 
influence of the philosophy of the Enlightenment at that time.
46
Indeed, the French Penal code of 
1791, which was adopted during the French revolution (1789-1799), excluded homosexuality from 
―sexual crimes‖ (before it, ―homosexual acts‖ were considered a capital offence in France)47 with 
only rape remaining as a punishable sexual crime.
48
Thus, France decriminalized homosexuality first 
in Europe.
49
The French Penal Code of 1810, created by Napoleon to replace the Penal Code of 
1791, subsequently confirmed this statement about homosexuality, and, moreover, was applied to 
corresponding laws in Belgium and the Netherlands.
50
 
Meanwhile, in another part of the world, in the Ottoman Empire, homosexuality was 
decriminalized in 1858 during so-called Tanzimât reformation.51Thus, as France decriminalized 
homosexuality first in the Christian world, the Ottoman Empire became the first country in the 
Muslim world to do the same. Interestingly, the Tanzimât reforms started from the Edict of Gülhane 
of 1839, which also declared the legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Ottoman 
Empire.
52
 
Following the examples France and the Ottoman Empire in the Catholic and Islamic worlds 
respectively, Russia became the pioneer in the decriminalization of homosexuality in the Orthodox 
world. Thus, the October Revolution of 1918 repealed the former criminal code, including the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
measures to utterly extirpate the crimes of wicked men, and put an end to the evil deeds of vice. For this reason we 
shall attempt to abolish the horrible crime of sodomy, which is as contrary to Divine precept as it is to chastity. And 
although the authority of the Holy Scriptures, and the censure of earthly laws, alike, prohibit offences of this kind, it is 
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shall, by order of the king, or of any judge, not only suffer emasculation, but also the penalty prescribed by 
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 Merrick and Ragan 1996 
47
 Ibid 
48
 Code pénal du 25 septembre 1791 
49
 Merrick and Ragan 1996 
50
 Ibid 
51
 Cleveland and Bunton 2009 
52
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abovementioned Article 995 which made muzhelozhstvo (―male homosexuality‖ in Russian) illegal. 
Indeed, the new Russian Federation Criminal Code of 1922 did not mention homosexuality at all.
53
 
We explored the decriminalization of homosexuality in three different countries which were 
pioneers in these issues in their surroundings – France, the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Russia. 
Decriminalization of homosexual activity was either a consequence of revolution and regime 
change (as in France or in Russia) or part of governmental reformative politics (as in Ottoman 
Empire). In all of these cases, this new policy was occurred together with the secularization of 
society and a significant shift from the religion-based laws and values. In some cases, as in France, 
the long influence of a new ideology, the philosophy of the Enlightenment, might have contributed 
to the legalization of homosexuality as well. Nevertheless, the examples of these countries did not 
result in a spillover effect and homosexuality remained illegal in most of the world in the 19
th
 and 
the first half of the 20
th
 centuries. The peak of homonegativity was reached in the mass persecution 
of homosexuals in Nazi Germany and Stalin‘s Russia, as well as in some other authoritarian 
societies of the 20
th
 century as Mussolini‘s Italy and General Franco‘s Spain. Better days for 
homosexuals only came in the second half of the 20
th
 century and only in the Western part of the 
world.  
Therefore, we return to the problem of the global divide on homosexuality in the 
contemporary world. Why has the Western world eliminated the pervasive homonegative influence 
of Christianity while the Islamic world persists in the persecution of homosexuals based on Islam? I 
argue that it is because in the West he church has been separated from the state with the 
establishment of a secular legal system with respect to human rights, while in the Islamic world 
many countries still live under religious, ―sharia law‖, and church and religious leaders still have a 
huge influence over society. To understand better the mechanism of value change, the difference 
between religious and secular values, and the influential power of churches over society, a literature 
review is required. What had already been done by other scholars to investigate this problem? What 
research has already been conducted, and how has it helped to answer this question of a great divide 
on homosexuality in the contemporary world? 
3. Literature Review 
 
Since our research about public opinion towards homosexuality will be conducted in the 
field of quantitative political science, sociology and cultural studies, we will explore the literature 
related to this issue in the same fields. In addition, because we try to understand the reasons behind 
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the global divide on homosexuality in the world, it makes sense to investigate papers based on data 
gathered from different countries from all over world.  
It is intuitive that when we research such issue as homosexuality and attitudes towards it, 
cultural context and religion may play an important role in shaping these attitudes. Historical review 
also suggested its importance. When we speak about culture and cultural change, it is appropriate to 
mention Ronald Inglehart, an American political scientist and director of the World Values Survey 
who had done a lot of research focused on cultural and value change, based on the world data from 
his survey. In his first two great volumes, The Silent Revolution (1977)
54
 and Culture Shift in 
Advanced Industrial Society (1990)
55, Inglehart discovered a significant shift in populations‘ values 
of modern societies. This so-called value change, according to Inglehart, goes in two directions – 
from traditional to secular, or rational values, and from survival to self-expression values. 
Traditional societal values, shaped throughout the centuries mostly by religion norms and religious 
beliefs, are replacing by secular-rational values in modern advanced industrial societies. In addition, 
when personal basic needs – food, shelter, safety (e.g., survival) – are fulfilled with a little help of 
economic growth, and when economic security is more or less achieved, people suddenly got a 
chance to think about their subjective well-being, quality of life and self-expression. This is, 
according to Inglehart, a transition from survival to self-expression values. In his next volume, 
Modernization and Postmodernization (1997)
56
, Inglehart linked this cultural and value change with 
economic development, modernization and industrialization. Thus, new values, e.g., self-expression 
and rational-secular values, are the attributes of postmodern societies who enjoy the benefits of 
long-term economic growth. Therefore, Inglehart called them also postmodern values. 
It is a very interesting theory indeed but what does it have to do with homosexuality? The 
important issue here that Inglehart, in relation to his cultural change, examined also the problem of 
gender equality, the attitudes towards family and sexual issues (children, divorce, abortion, 
homosexuality) and the tolerance of minorities and outgroups, again, including homosexuals. He 
discovered that the acceptance of homosexuality is correlated positively with self-expression and 
secular-rational values and negatively – with traditional and survival values. Therefore, an 
increasing tolerance towards homosexuals and legal recognition of homosexual relations in the 
Western world could be due to this value change. In addition, Inglehart discovered that religion and 
religious beliefs, in the contrary, are linked positively with traditional values and negatively – with 
secular-rational values. Therefore, religion and religious beliefs could be considered an important 
predictor of personal attitudes towards homosexuality. This fact received confirmation from history. 
                                                          
54
 Inglehart 1977 
55
 Inglehart 1990 
56
 Inglehart 1997 
11 
 
Homosexuality was first criminalized under the influence of new religions – Christianity and Islam, 
and then decriminalized either after revolutions (and what is revolution if not the most radical value 
change?) and secularization.  
In addition, economic development is another predictor of public opinion on homosexuality. 
Since poverty and economic insecurity are associated with secular values, and, therefore, less 
tolerance towards homosexuality, the economic prosperity and social welfare, in the contrary, 
promoted the self-expression values and increasing acceptance of homosexuality.  
Inglehart and Baker (2000) tested the thesis that economic development and modernization 
is linked to the change of values, including the public opinion towards homosexuality. For this 
purpose they used data from three waves of the World Values Surveys from 65 societies and 75% 
of world population. Public acceptance of homosexuality in their view is very important because it 
could be considered level of tolerance and acceptance of any outgroup or minority in particular 
society.
57
The acceptance of homosexuality, in turn, is associated with changing of societal values 
from traditional, survival values of pre-industrial societies to secular-rational values of 
postindustrial ones.  
As was mentioned above, Inglehart and Baker found evidence that industrialization and 
economic development promotes shift in values and is responsible for huge and pervasive cultural 
changes in many postindustrial societies. Inversely, economic collapse tends to move societies in 
opposite direction. However, Inglehart and Baker also found evidence for persistence of distinctive 
traditional values and associated with them intolerance towards homosexuality in some societies 
despite of the economic development. What could be the reasons for that?  
To explain this notable contradiction, we should remember, that different societies, even 
when they are subjected to the same economic development, react to it in different ways. In general, 
many country-specific factors could be responsible for these differences, but the most interesting for 
our analysis is cultural heritage which also shapes the development of each particular society. Many 
scholars have explored this issue as well. For example, Weber argued that traditional values shaped 
usually by religion have an overwhelming influence on society and its institutions.
58
Therefore, we 
need to investigate in more details the role of religion in shaping values and culture. What is 
interesting here, however, is what we now call traditional values, are values which shaped by 
relatively new world religions – Christianity and Islam. Back in pre Christian times, as our literature 
review suggested, traditional values were different and they supported homosexuality. It‘s new 
religion who brought negative change to these values.  
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In addition, Inglehart‘s works were concentrated more on value change in postindustrial 
societies in general, and homosexuality acceptance was only one small part of this great change, 
along with increasing tolerance towards other marginalized groups. In their research Inglehart and 
his colleagues did not focus on factors which influence the acceptance of homosexuality 
specifically, though. Surely, the shift towards secular-rational and self-expression values of 
postindustrial societies matters if we speak about changing attitudes towards homosexuality as well. 
However, is this value change is necessary and sufficient condition for homosexuality acceptance, 
or, would it be possible that, despite of general value change in particular society, homosexuality is 
still not accepted there? Are there also other factors that might influence public opinion on 
homosexuality which were overlooked by Inglehart and his colleagues? We need more specific 
works about homosexuality acceptance to answer these questions. Fortunately, we do have a plenty 
of scholars in quantitative political science, sociology and cultural studies who explored this issue 
and – what a coincidence – were inspired by Inglehart‘s work initially. 
Many researchers explored the role of the religion, religiosity and cultural context in shaping 
attitudes towards homosexuality. Thus, Adamczyk and Pitt (2009)
59
 measured the impact of 
religiosity on attitudes towards homosexuality using data from World Values Survey. They 
conducted a multilevel research on individual and country levels with justifiability of 
homosexuality as a dependent variable. The independent variables of their primary interest were 
self-expression values vs. survival values (based on Inglehart and Baker‘s index), personal 
religiosity (measured as importance of religion in personal life, only on individual level) and 
religion denomination (they used Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist). 
Their correlation analysis results demonstrated that the largest correlation for personal attitudes 
towards homosexuality is country survival vs. self-expression index. The following important 
factors of public opinion on homosexuality are living in Muslim-majority country and then Muslim 
religious affiliation, both of which are highly negatively correlated with acceptance of 
homosexuality. The importance of religion in general proved to be the least correlated with their 
variable of interest. Their regression results confirmed the correlation ones. Individuals who live in 
countries with self-expression orientations have more approving attitudes towards homosexuality 
than residents of countries with survival ones. Living in Muslim-majority country, compared to 
living in Christian or Hindu or Buddhist society, along with Muslim religious affiliation compared 
to other religion denominations, is proved to be the predictor of more disapproving attitudes 
towards homosexuality as well. It is not surprisingly also that general religiosity affects tolerance of 
homosexuality in a negative way too, though differences in levels of acceptance between Muslims 
and other religion confessions are notable and significant. Their another important finding that 
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survival vs. self-expression index is highly correlated with living in Muslim-majority country and 
that almost all of Muslim countries with a slight exception of Nigeria have a strong survival 
orientation.  
Adamczyk and Pitt‘s findings are indeed very important. They gave an additional empirical 
support for Inglehart‘ argument about self-expression values as one of the main predictors of 
homosexuality acceptance. They demonstrated also that though personal religiosity in general 
affects attitudes towards homosexuality in a negative way, the difference between religion 
affiliations is also important. Thus, Muslims have much more disapproving attitudes towards 
homosexuality compared to members of other religion denominations. However, that could be the 
case not only because of negative role of Islam compared to other religions in this respect, but also 
because of the strong survival orientation of almost all of Muslim-majority countries, and the 
survival orientation is proved to be one of the strongest predictors of negative attitudes towards 
homosexuality.  
Adamczyk and Pitt, however, did not find significant differences in attitudes towards 
homosexuality between members of other than Muslim religion denominations. It is intuitive 
though that the attitudes of Buddhists might be different from the ones of a Christian, for instance. 
We need to explore other researches which examine the relation between religiosity and the religion 
denomination in particular, and attitudes towards homosexuality (following Adamczyk and Pitt, we 
will call it later ATH).  
Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015)60  conducted a multilevel analysis based on data of 78 
countries from the two waves of the World Values Survey (1999-2004, 2005-2009). They measured 
the relationships between religious denomination, religiosity and the ATH. It is interesting, 
however, that, using the same data as Adamczyk and Pitt and almost the same variables of interests 
(both dependent variable – justifiability of homosexuality, and independent variables – level of 
religiosity and religion denomination), yet they received a slightly different results. It partially 
might be due to more excessive measures of religious affiliation in their research. They included 
more religion denominations and scaled them from 1 to 6 based on to which extent they promote 
so-called homonegativity (negative attitudes towards homosexuality). Here is their scale, with Islam 
as the most homonegative religion and atheism as the least: 
 
―1. Islam 
2. Catholicism/Protestant Free Churches/Orthodox Christianity 
3. Traditional (European) Protestantism 
4. Hinduism 
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5. Buddhism/Taoism/Confucianism 
6. Atheism‖61 
 
Their regression results supported the hypothesis made by the authors in abovementioned 
scale. The highly significant negative influence on religion on ATH is strongest in Muslim case 
which is in agreement with Adamczyk and Pitt results. The differences in ATH between members 
of other religion denominations turned out to be more significant than in Adamczyk and Pitt 
research, however. Thus, Orthodox Christians and Free Church Protestants proved to be more 
homonegative than Catholics and Traditional Protestants, and the latters are more homonegative 
than Buddhists and Hindus. The atheists turned out to be the least homonegative group, as was 
expected by researchers. The general level of personal religiosity also affects ATH in a negative 
way, though to which extent it highly depends on particular religion denomination. These findings 
further support the argument about importance of particular religion denomination when we explore 
the ATH. Inglehart, for instance, measured only general level of personal religiosity and did not 
paid specific attention to the religion denomination. Though the last two researches demonstrate 
that, at least in case of ATH, this focus is indeed important. Thus, we should not worry too much 
about strong religiosity of a Buddhist as we should do about the keen religious spirit of a Muslim, if 
we care about gay rights. However, the slight discrepancies between two researches in terms of 
differences in ATH between members of other than Muslim religion denominations suggest that we 
should replicate this analysis in our own research.  
One more research contributed to the field of relations between religion and homosexuality. 
Rimac and Štulhofer (2008)62 explored the determinants of homonegativity in Europe using data 
from the European Values Study (1999/2000). As their dependent variables, they used two variables 
– ―Neighbors: Homosexuals‖ as an indicator of social distance towards homosexuals, and the 
abovementioned ―Justifiable: Homosexuality‖ as an indicator of justification of homosexuality. 
According to their findings, ―social distance towards homosexual persons was predicted by the 
Eastern Orthodox religion, a greater degree of urbanization, economic development and 
immigration‖. Thus, as for religion denominations, Orthodox Christianity demonstrated to be the 
most homonegative and the Protestant Christianity – the least one (since this research was 
conducted on data from EU, no Muslim or Buddhist religion denomination was included). 
However, negative role of immigration on ATH with borderline significance hints that Islam might 
play a role there since many immigrants were Muslims. Another research is required to support this 
argument, however. The positive role of economic development on ATH gave further support for 
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Inglehart‘s argument. Urbanization could be considered part of economic development of the 
country and thus influence ATH in indirect way, but also cities, because of its big size and active 
social life, could give homosexual people more opportunities to socialize on the one hand and to 
become relatively invisible among the all citizens – on the other (Lauria & Knopp, 1985)63. 
The possible role of immigration in shaping negative ATH in EU suggests us to explore 
another detailed research. Röder (2015)64 investigated the immigrants‘ ATH in Europe using data 
from European Social Survey (ESS) from 27 EU and EFTA countries. Her dependent variable is 
―gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.‖ As independent variables, 
Röder included ―Immigrant Groups‖ (divided by generation and by religion denomination), 
―Religiosity and Attendance‖ (the level of personal religiosity and the frequency of church 
attendance), ―Length of Residence‖, and the ―Differences in acceptance of homosexuality between 
host and origin country‖ (the last variable came from World Values Survey). Röder main finding is 
that Muslims and to a lesser extent other non-Christian and Eastern Orthodox migrants hold overall 
more negative ATH. With Muslims, it is the least supportive of homosexuality immigrant group in 
the first generation, and along with the Eastern Orthodox Christians the only immigrant group of the 
second generation who holds the negative ATH even after controlling for demographic composition 
and individual-level religiosity. Thus, the Muslim migrants hold the most homonegative attitudes 
and their views persist even in the second generation. These findings are indeed very important 
since they indicate that even in the countries with majority of population supports homosexuality, 
some population groups could persist in their homonegative attitudes. It is also demonstrated that 
the effect of homonegative Islamic values on Muslim immigrants is stronger than that of self-
expression values of the host countries.  
The fact that in general Muslims expressed the most homonegative ATH which persists even 
in the next generations of immigrants is supported by plenty of other studies (Simon 2008
65
; 
Stulhofer and Rimac 2009
66
; Gerhards 2010
67
; Van den Akker, Van der Ploeg, and Scheepers 
2012
68
). All of these findings once more suggest the high importance of religion and Muslim 
religion denomination in particular in shaping negative ATH, with stronger impact on ATH than 
self-expression values and economic development, for instance.  
One more significant research focused on relationships between ATH and religiosity has 
been done by abovementioned Pew Research Center in 2013
69
. Thus, PRC also suggested and 
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discovered strong empirical evidence on relationships between religiosity and acceptance of 
homosexuality. Based on their measurement, they concluded that ―there is far less acceptance of 
homosexuality in countries where religion is central to people‘s lives – measured by whether they 
consider religion to be very important, whether they believe it is necessary to believe in God in 
order to be moral, and whether they pray at least once a day‖70. Thus, PRC included in their 
research the general religiosity and the frequency of religious activity (praying) and did not divide 
their respondents by religion denominations. However, they still were able to produce notable 
results, demonstrating the negative correlation between the religiosity and ATH. 
However, there are some notable exceptions in their results. For example, Russia got a low 
score on religiosity on PRC scale, but only 16% of Russians are ready to accept homosexuality. In 
the contrary, Brazil and Philippines received high scores of tolerance towards homosexuality 
despite their high religiosity levels in PRC report.
71
Therefore, religiosity might play an important 
role in public opinion on homosexuality, but it cannot be the only factor which influences it.  
In addition, we should remember that PRC data come from 39 countries from all around the 
world. It is indeed good research in terms of representation of different parts of the world in one 
research. The data is, however, are far from being comprehensive and many important countries 
(for instance, China) are not represented in their data. Therefore, more comprehensive analysis is 
required. For example, combined datasets from World Values Survey and European Values Surveys 
might offer us data from more than one hundred countries.
72
 
As was mentioned above, general religiosity and Muslim religion denomination play a 
significant negative role in shaping negative ATH. If religiosity and Muslim religion denomination 
are the main determinants of homonegativity in the world, however, how could we explain such 
cases as Russia and China, both of which are relatively secular and yet highly homonegative 
nations? Therefore, if religion in general and religion denomination in particular are important in 
shaping ATH, it is not the only important determinant though. Which could be the other ones, then? 
Some scholars argue that political regime in general and democracy matters when we are 
speaking about gay rights. For example, Omar G. Encarnación found the strong correlation between 
democracy and gay rights, e.g., that in modern world gay rights are mostly embraced in democratic 
regimes and suppressed in authoritarian ones.
73
 Correlation does not imply causation, however, and, 
therefore, Encarnación tries to find further evidence about causal effects of democracy on gay rights 
and homosexuality acceptance in particular society. Thus, he argues that process of democratization 
fostered the evolution of so-called ―citizenship‖, or membership in polity, and active citizenship 
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then protects repressed or marginalized groups, like poor, disabled, racial, ethnic and religion 
minorities, and homosexuals.
74Encarnación states then that ―democracy also facilitates gay rights by 
making possible a vibrant and robust civil society that can exist only within a political framework 
allowing for freedom of association‖.(Encarnación (2014), p.99) Therefore, strong civil society, and 
sometimes even civil disobedience to authorities is a necessary prerequisite of protection and 
promotion of gay rights.
75
 Indeed, if we remember the Stonewall riot in 1969 in New York City,
76
 
which was followed next year by the first world‘s gay pride parade in history, this argument might 
seem more plausible
77
. 
Gay rights protection in democracies might be facilitated also by intra-civil society 
collaboration, e.g., by fruitful relationships between gay rights and human rights movements, or 
between LGBT and feminist movements.
78
It is hardly possible to think about such collaboration in 
authoritarian regimes where the even existence of strong civil society and any human rights 
movements is highly questionable. Encarnación states further that ―gay rights also depend on a 
strong judiciary and the rule of law, hallmarks of any healthy democratic polity‖. (Encarnación 
(2014), p. 99-100) Thus, democracy is necessary prerequisite for gay rights because it provides the 
better opportunities for gay people to advocate for their rights in courts, party system, through 
LGBT organizations, and gives them more ways for self-expression because of the changed social 
environment.
79
 
Therefore, it is not democracy itself which fostered the gay rights protection in Western 
countries, but the attributes which are necessary for democracy, facilitated the promotion of gay 
rights as well. According to Encarnación, the most important of these attributes are strong civil 
society, independent judicial system and the rule of law, and collaboration between different human 
rights social movements. Based on Encarnación arguments, it makes sense to include all of these 
variables into analysis to discover which of these factors plays the strongest role there and which 
are less important for gay rights.  
However, Encarnación‘s analysis suggests, that countries ruled by authoritarian, non-
democratic regimes, provide less or no opportunities for homosexuals to advocate for their rights. 
That could explain why such countries as Russia and China, with relatively secular populations, still 
face problems with gay rights and give no any legal recognition to same sex marriages. 
However, democracy may be necessary, but not sufficient condition for gay rights 
recognition and protection. For example, India became a democratic and secular republic in 1950 
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with introduction of its constitution. However, homosexual relations are still illegal in India 
nationwide from 1861 with penalty up to 10 years.  Indian Supreme Court appealed and overturned 
this code in 2009, thus making homosexuality legal but only for four years and only on the territory 
of Delhi, and even this decision was revoked already in 2013. Therefore, now homosexuality is still 
illegal in India, and more than fifty years of democracy didn‘t help India to protect gay rights and to 
give a legal recognition to the same-sex marriages – inversely, the homosexual relations are still 
penalized in India. Therefore, even if political regime matters for gay rights and recognition of 
same-sex marriages, it is not the only factor which influences this issue.  
Another flaw in Encarnación research is that he explores mostly the effects of democracy on 
legal recognition of gay rights and pays little attention to the value change which leads to 
homosexuality acceptance in society and might precede the legal issues. Surely, legal recognition of 
same-sex marriages, and protection of gay people from discrimination based on their sexual 
orientation, made gay people feel safer and their lives – much easier. However, in general law 
change does not mean value change – e.g., negative attitudes towards homosexuality in particular 
society might persist despite of legal recognition of gay rights. Therefore, we need some measures 
of value change which could demonstrate that not only law protects gay people from discrimination, 
but societal attitudes towards homosexuality had also been changed during last fifty years in most 
of Western democracies. 
Thus, we come back to Inglehart who argues that political and law change is usually 
preceded by a value change. Therefore, according to him, societal values towards homosexuality 
should change first in order to allow the legal recognition of gay rights and same-sex marriages. 
Still, we need to keep in mind the political regime and the legal matters associated with it as 
important predictors of ATH. 
What other scholars said about this legal framework for gay rights, importance of which 
stated by Encarnación? Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) tested this legal framework in their research but 
did not find a significant effect. Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) also explored this issue using more 
detailed framework. They included into their analysis as explanatory variables the following ones: a 
fact that a country has signed the Declaration on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity as introduced to the General Assembly of the United Nations; the number of years since 
decriminalization of homosexual activities; and a composed index from the International Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA) which basically contains all basic gay rights 
granted in particular country (same-sex marriage or other registered partnership, child adoption by 
homosexual couples, inclusion of sexual orientation in antidiscrimination labor laws, etc.) Thus, 
their so-called ―legal index‖ comprised all issues highlighted by Encarnación and, intuitively, 
highly correlated with democratic political regime. What is important, however, that this legal 
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index, along with UN Declaration variable, appeared to be highly significant. Thus, their findings 
gave an additional support to Encarnación‘s argument: ―the more legal rights granted to 
homosexual people, the more positive attitudes the general population has toward homosexuality‖. 
Some scholars offered another explanation for possible differences in ATH around the 
world. Thus, Huntington divided the world into eight major ―cultural zones‖ based on specific 
cultural differences which were persisted through centuries.
80
 These zones were shaped by religious 
tradition special for each particular zone, and by other ideologies (e.g., Communism). According to 
Huntington, there are following eight cultural zones in modern world: Western and Orthodox 
Christianity, the Islamic world, and the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American 
zones. This typology, however, is not quite consistent with a real world dynamics in our discussion. 
For example, Huntington did not distinguish between Catholic and Protestant societies (in his 
typology, they are united into one cultural zone – the Western Christianity), but Protestant and 
Catholic societies, as was noted above, have many significant differences in their values, including 
views on acceptance of homosexuality, therefore it makes sense to separate them into two different 
cultural zones, as actually was already done by Baker and Inglehart.
81
 
Inversely, Japanese society, even if it distinct from Confucian ones in its religion (dominant 
religions in Japan are Shintoism and Buddhism), shared many cultural similarities with Chinese and 
other Confucian societies for centuries, and, therefore, Japanese and Confucian cultural zones could 
be united into one zone. In addition, we should bear in mind, that many countries in Northern, 
Western and Eastern Africa are Muslim countries nowadays, therefore, the difference between 
Islamic and African cultural zones might turn out to be not so significant. However, in general, 
division between different cultural zones will be important for our analysis. In addition, it would be 
useful to include into our analysis one more cultural zone – Communist, based on Inglehart and 
Baker‘s typology. 82  Even if Communist ideology is relatively new in the world compared to 
traditional religions, it had its enduring influence on huge part of the world, from Eastern Europe 
and Russia to China and North Korea. Therefore, the cultural zones for our analysis will be the 
following nine ones: Communist world, Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox Christianity, the Islamic 
world, and the Confucian, Hindu, African, and Latin American zones. 
The importance of Communism in shaping negative ATH was discovered in the 
abovementioned research by Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015). They included Communist heritage 
as an explanatory variable on the aggregated level. In their findings, the residents of (-post) 
Communist countries turned out to be significantly more homonegative which could explain the 
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cases of Russia and China. Another interesting finding in their research that, because of the negative 
interaction effect between Communism and religiosity, ―religiosity increases homonegativity less 
strongly in (post-) communist countries than in other countries, although the level of 
homonegativity is higher in (post-) communist countries‖ (quotation) because of the Communism 
itself. Thus, by introducing into research different cultural zones and Communist ideology in 
particular in addition to religion and religion denomination, more discrepancies in ATH could be 
explained.  
After exploration of bunch of researches concerning ATH, we discovered that their opinions 
about the reasons of this ―great divide‖ on homosexuality are in turn divided significantly. Some 
scholars, as Encarnación, argued that type of political regime and legal framework matters when we 
are speaking about gay rights, and the democracy fostered the legal recognition of gay rights and 
same-sex marriages by creation of specific political and social conditions necessary for it, while 
dictatorships hinder the gay rights recognition because they lack these specific conditions. 
However, Encarnación argued mostly about legal recognition of gay rights and not about value 
change of societal attitudes towards homosexuality. Inglehart stated that political and law change in 
particular society is usually preceded by value change though. His self-expression and secular-
rational values are one of the main predictors of positive ATH. Inglehart and Baker emphasized the 
importance of modernization and economic development for changing of societal values, in 
particular towards acceptance of homosexuality. However, other scholars emphasized a significant 
role of religion and religion denomination in shaping negative ATH. Thus, Jäckle and 
Wenzelburger (2015), Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) discovered the high negative impact of personal 
religiosity in general and Muslim religion denomination in particular on ATH. Before them, Rimac 
and Štulhofer (2008) investigated the main determinants of homonegativity in Europe and stated a 
significant role of religion denomination and immigration in shaping negative ATH. Echoing these 
findings, Röder (2015) conducted research about immigrants‘ ATH in EU and discovered that 
Muslim immigrants hold persistent homonegative views despite of positive ATH of majority of 
population in the host country, and that these negative views persist also through generations of 
Muslim immigrants. This finding suggests the high importance of religion in general and Muslim 
religion denomination in particular in shaping negative ATH, which could overweight the positive 
influence of self-expression values, political regime, legal framework and economic development 
on ATH.  
Finally, Huntington offered a concept of cultural zones which shaped population values 
throughout the centuries based on religion beliefs and geographical position. Inglehart and Baker 
developed this concept by including Communist cultural one based on relatively new ideology of 
Communism which could nevertheless play an important role in shaping population attitudes. 
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Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2014) found an empirical support to the argument about negative 
influence of Communist ideology on ATH.  
However, some questions about ATH remained unanswered. For example, what is special 
about India, where criminal penalty for homosexual activity is still implemented into the law, 
despite of fifty years of democracy in this country and despite of relative tolerance of Hindu 
towards homosexuality? In the contrary, why Latin America, with its relatively high religiosity (and 
since most Latin American countries are Catholic, and Catholics are not such tolerant towards 
homosexuals as Hindus, for instance), has made a substantial progress with respect to 
homosexuality acceptance and gay rights? Which factors play a significant role in these cases which 
were overlooked by researchers? The implications of different cultural zones and historical patterns 
might help there.  
Speaking about effects of religion, impact of general religiosity and particular religion 
denomination was explored excessively. However, what about religion attendance and active 
church membership, for instance? We might expect that ATH of a particular person who visited 
church one time per year and every week, might be different. In addition, the church clergy could 
have different ATH than its parish, too. The importance of religion attendance and church 
membership might vary in different religion denominations as well. We might also expect that 
people who place their confidence in religion over science, churches over other institutions, and 
religion leaders over other political leaders, might share more homonegative views, than other 
religious believers, though. All these hypotheses could be tested in our own model. Before testing 
it, however, we should try to understand the mechanism behind value change in general and ATH in 
particular. To do it, we need some theoretical background.  
4. Theoretical Background: Attitude Change 
 
Our research question is why contemporary world is divided so sharply in question of ATH, 
e.g., why most of the developed countries established legislation which more or less protects gay 
rights by now, while in most of developing countries homosexuality is still illegal? To answer this 
question, however, it is important to understand which factors influence public opinion on 
homosexuality in the most significant way. Literature review suggested that the main factors which 
affect ATH are religiosity in general and religion denomination in particular, political regime, 
including legal framework, and economic performance. Cultural zone, to which a certain country 
belongs, and Communist ideology in particular might play role in shaping ATH as well.  
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However, if high religiosity and Muslim religion denomination are associated with higher 
levels of homonegativity, could we claim that they actually cause the negative ATH? Everything is 
not so simple, however. Thus, monotheistic religions, Islam and Christianity in particular, might 
affect personal attitudes in general and ATH in particular, changing ATH in a negative way. As we 
stated in our historical review, almost all pagan cultures and civilizations either had neutral or 
positive ATH, with a slight exception of Ancient Egypt. Homonegativity as a new attitude and 
persecution of gay people followed by this attitude change, was introduced in our world only with 
Christianity and Islam, we should not forget that. However, if we want to have a deeper 
understanding of our subject, we need to explore the actual mechanisms of these attitudes and 
values changes. How new religions could change population attitudes so fast and drastically, what 
mechanism was involved in it?  
The same question is required to be answered if we speak about modern value change, 
which lead to positive ATH. What was the force behind this change which was so powerful to 
overturn the two millenia of negative influence of religion over people‘s minds? Inglehart 
associated it with post materialism and economic development. Indeed, post industrialization, 
economic performance and secularization might be related positively to this value change. 
However, same as with religion, we do not observe the exact causal mechanism, how this value 
change happened. To understand it, we need to investigate, what attitudes and values actually are, 
and how they could be changed in general, and then to apply this knowledge to ATH. For this 
purpose, we need some insights from social psychology. Why psychology, then? Since we deal with 
personal values and attitudes, and this topic by its nature is referred to psychology.  
In this paper, we used terms ―attitudes‖ and ―values‖ interchangeably, but we actually need 
to see also the difference between attitudes, values and beliefs. Thus, in psychology attitude is a 
negative or positive evaluation of any particular object by the individual (Fazio, 1990
83
; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010
84
). Belief is a ‗cognitive component‘ (Heberlein, 201285) in the individual‘s mind, 
which determined what is believed to be true about the attitude object by this individual. Thus, a 
statement ―I do not like homosexuals‖ is an attitude, but a claim that ―Homosexuality is a dreadful 
sin‖ is already a belief. Values, in turn, are broader, than attitudes, more stable and usually are not 
confined to any particular object. Thus, negative attitudes and beliefs about homosexuality could be 
a part of broader Christian or Muslim values, which are disapproving of homosexuality. We will 
focus on the attitudes and their change, since attitude is easier to change, than beliefs and values, 
and they are more susceptible to an external influence, than values and beliefs (Heberlein, 2012). 
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We should bear in mind, though, that attitude change could also be a part of broader value or beliefs 
change. However, if we are about to understand the mechanism of attitude change, it could give us 
useful insights about the reasons behind changes of systems of values and beliefs as well.  
To understand the mechanisms of attitude change, we need to know in more details what 
attitudes actually are and how they are constructed. We have several theories from social 
psychology about it. Thus, MODE (motivation and opportunity as determinants) model (Fazio, 
1990
86
) and the meta-cognitive model (MCM, Petty et al., 2007
87
) view attitudes as long-term 
memory structures. Thus, these theories treat attitudes as relatively stable entities which are not 
likely to be easily changed over time. In the contrary, Schwarz (2007)
88
 proposed that attitudes are 
evaluative judgments which could be formed instantly based on currently accessible information. 
Conrey & Smith (2007)
89
 state, that attitudes are ―time–dependent states of the system‖ rather than 
―static ‗things‘ that are ‗stored‘ in memory‖ (p. 718). Therefore, there is a dispute in a scientific 
community about stability versus changeability of attitudes. We need to be aware of both of these 
polar views since the attitude change theories depend on how attitudes are actually perceived.  
Thus, Petty et. al (2006)
90
 offered PAST (―past attitudes are still there‖) model based on 
their MCM model. According to this model, even if the attitude change happened and individual 
does not consider her old attitude appropriate anymore, this attitude still lingered in her memory 
however, but is ―tagged‖ as false. For example, a particular person used to smoke a lot and liked it 
(thus, this person had a positive attitude towards smoking in the past), but, after an exposure to the 
knowledge about health hazards of smoking, this person elaborated a new, negative attitude towards 
smoking. However, according to PAST model, her former positive attitude would not disappear but 
will be stored in her memory as ―invalid‖. What is important about this model that it predicts 
ambivalent attitudes after attitude change if the new attitudes are opposite to the old ones. This is 
because old attitudes still linger in the human memory and this could cause the feeling of 
uncertainty at the unconscious level. Stronger these old attitudes were and faster the change 
happened, longer this lingering effect will last and more ambivalent new attitudes will be. It could 
be applied directly to ATH. Thus, if negative ATH were stored in some person‘s memory for their 
whole life and then suddenly attitude change happened, the old negative associations with 
homosexuality will be lingered in memory for a long while, causing the implicit ambiguity of new 
ATH instead of explicit approval. It might explain why even in the West nowadays we still quite 
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often observe the cases of homonegativity and hate speeches against homosexuals. Memories and 
past attitudes do not die fast. 
However, this PAST model only provides us with knowledge of this ―lingering effect‖ of 
old attitudes after attitude change but does not explain the exact mechanism of this change. This 
model could suggest to us that, probably, time and generational effect is required in order to achieve 
the complete change in ATH to the positive, but, again, we still do not know how this change 
happened. To understand this, we will explore another model of attitude change – APE (associative-
propositional evaluation model). This model was proposed by Gawronski & Bodenhausen (2006)
91
 
and deals with explicit and implicit attitude change. In this model, associative evaluation, as type of 
a mental process, is a basis of implicit attitude which could be activated automatically when person 
encounters a relevant association.  Thus, if a particular person associates homosexuals, say, with 
HIV, then any mention of homosexuals would bring into her mind also HIV issue. Then, if this 
person has a negative attitude towards HIV, which is actually reasonable, this attitude would pass 
upon homosexuals as well, since in her mind, at the unconscious level, homosexuality and HIV are 
connected. However, different associational patterns may be activated depending on the context, 
and they also could be changed if new association would replace the old one, because new one is, 
for example, more impressive to a particular individual. Thus, if association of homosexuals with a 
fashion would replace their association with HIV, then the person‘s ATH would change to the 
better, because of these implicit associations. It is worth to note also that these associative 
evaluations are independent of the personal beliefs about what is true or false. Thus, a particular 
person could express a negative ATH because of the association of homosexuals with HIV even if 
this person consciously considers homosexuality to be a normal thing. In the contrary, other person 
might show positive ATH because of her association of homosexuals with fashion, even if she 
disapproves of homosexuality because of her religious views. What could cause the attitude change 
in this case, then? As was mentioned above, it is the changes in associative structure (e.g., 
association of homosexuals with HIV is changed to association of them with fashion) or in the 
direct stimulus which activates particular associations. Adding positive associations to an attitude 
object which change attitude to the better, is called evaluative conditioning.  
Another side of the coin, propositional reasoning, is a basis of explicit attitudes. Such 
evaluations are based on logic and used to make judgements. The connection between propositional 
reasoning and associative evaluation is explained by Strack & Deutsch (2004)
92
 who stated that 
individuals pick up their associations and transform them into propositions (thus, positive 
association with gay people might be transformed into a proposition ―I like gay people‖, and vice 
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versa). However, what is different from associative evaluation, those propositions are checked for 
validity using logical reasoning. After they passed this ―validity test‖, so-called ―truth values‖ are 
assigned to them. The proposition is usually judged as valid if it is consistent with other relevant 
propositions related to this issue. Thus, the only one proposition ―I like gays‖ could be not enough 
for our brain to accept if all other propositions about gays that we acquired during our lifetime, tell 
us that ―gays are bad‖. What is important here is that propositions are drawn from associations, but, 
unlike associations, they are checked for validity by our brain and might be used to make 
judgements.  
The transformation of associative evaluations into propositions might explain how implicit 
attitude change could contribute to an explicit attitude change (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006)
93
. 
Thus, if more and more new positive propositions about homosexuals came to our mind, they could 
overweigh the old negative propositions, and this way attitude change may happen. However, the 
opposite case, when a particular proposition may contribute to a change in associative evaluations, 
is also possible. Thus, just an acquaintance with a cultural or religion stereotype about certain 
minority groups may automatically create negative associations with those minority groups 
(Devine, 1989
94
). The power of this reasoning might be so enduring that the members of this 
discriminated minority group might express automatic negative reactions towards other members of 
their group, or even towards themselves (Siebler et al. 2010
95
). We need this theory about 
associative evaluations and propositional reasoning to be able to distinguish between two possible 
ways of attitude change, though. The first way is when new positive associations could change old 
negative stereotype, and the other way, when, in the contrary, a proposition based on that stereotype 
creates automatically negative associations.  
We will be, therefore, concentrated on two different ways of attitude change. First one deals 
with stereotypes rooted in culture and religion, which could contribute to negative propositions 
about homosexuality, which, in turn, automatically creates negative associations with 
homosexuality. The second way is about the informational impact on associations which could 
create new, positive associations, which in turns contributes to change of propositions and, then, 
attitude change. To understand this mechanism, some more insights from social psychology are 
required.  
We need to be familiar with heuristics in order to understand better the process of attitude 
formation and change. In psychology, heuristics refers to formation of beliefs and judgements, and 
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to the decision making process as well.
96
Heuristics usually deals with automatic, intuitive 
judgements, which are similar in their nature to the automatic associations we discussed above
97
. 
However, all human judgements are restrained by the available information and cognitive 
limitations, which lead Herbert A. Simon to his idea about bounded rationality
98
. Availability 
restrictions related to availability heuristics which was discovered by Tversky and Kahneman in 
1974
99
. The very basic idea from availability heuristics is that in the process of formation 
judgements or attitudes depends on how many examples associated with assessing attitude object 
come to person‘s mind, e.g., how familiar this person with this attitude object. This concept, in turn, 
leads to familiarity heuristics, which was developed on the basis of availability heuristics. In 
familiarity heuristics, familiar is favored over the strange and novel
100
. This type of heuristics might 
be very useful if we apply it to our field. 
Thus, there is a mere exposure effect which could change attitudes by a mere exposure of a 
particular person to an attitude object (Zajonc, 1965
101
). Citing Petty et al. (2006, p. 623): 
 
―The more often a person encounters a novel (usually neutral) attitude object, the more 
favorable he or she is likely to evaluate that object; this effect is stronger when exposure to the 
object is subliminal rather than supraliminal.‖ 
 
Subliminal refers to unconscious here and supraliminal – to conscious. Thus, we could say 
that mere exposure stronger affects implicit attitudes through associations, unconsciously. 
Familiarity makes heart to grow fonder, then. Familiarity and mere exposure effect may play role in 
formation of evaluative judgements as well
102
. Bohner & Dickel (2011) stated that subliminal 
repeated exposure to a particular attitude object ―may affect associative evaluations outside of 
conscious awareness; this, in turn, may provide the basis for deliberate evaluative judgments‖ 
(Bohner & Dickel, 2011, p. 399-400). Zebrowitz et al. (2008) tested this effect on a group of white 
students who were repeatedly exposed to the black faces. Later, these students found black faces 
more attractive than those students who were exposed only to white faces, or not exposed to any 
faces at all.
103
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In addition to familiarity heuristics, here is an expertise heuristics (i.e., ―experts are usually 
correct‖), which applies that persons derive their attitudes from the experts‘ statements and 
judgements (Petty & Wegener, 1998
104
). Expert could be any person who exerts a certain authority 
over person‘s judgements and whose attitudes are trusted. It could be scientist, politician, or 
religious leader. The most important characteristic of a credible expert is her trustworthiness in the 
eyes of her trustees, then.  
Now, having this theoretical basis from social psychology, we could apply it to ATH. 
Familiarity could play a double role in shaping ATH, though. On the one hand, people‘s tendency 
to favor familiar over strange and novel may result in xenophobia towards any strangers and 
outgroups, including homosexuals. On the other hand, when stranger is familiarized, he is not 
feared anymore.  
Expertise heuristics works in a slightly different way. When, for example, religious leaders 
preach against homosexuality, this could cause homonegative attitudes among religious believers in 
the eyes of those these leaders have a certain authority. In the contrary, when celebrities and 
politicians stand for homosexuals in public space, the expertise heuristics works for homosexuals 
changing ATH to the better.  
Could it be, however, there any causal mechanism which could help us to understand how 
ATH actually shaped? For simplicity, let us assume that from the beginning, any particular 
individual is not prejudiced against homosexuals, and, therefore, has neutral ATH. Thus, if person 
has no certain opinion about homosexuality, how then it could turn out to be positive or negative? 
Obviously, the personal attitudes could be shaped by the external influences, by the environment 
where this person lives and acts. Then, we could observe two different situations. First, imagine 
person who lives in a society where homosexuality is illegal, and, therefore, gay people, like 
criminals, hide and become invisible for a general population, but politicians and religion leaders, in 
the contrary, could freely preach against homosexuals. Here we could observe the work of two 
psychological effects discussed above: availability heuristics and expertise heuristics. Since gay 
people are hiding and living in a closet in societies which made homosexuality illegal, there are no 
any available examples of real homosexuals for the majority of population. Thus, homosexuals 
moved from the category of familiar to the category of strange after homosexuality is declared to be 
illegal. In the contrary, religious leaders and politicians are free to speak and preach against 
homosexuals and, therefore, because of expertise effect peoples‘ ATH changed. That could explain 
how ATH were changed from the neutral and positive during the pagan times to extremely negative 
after introduction of Christianity and Islam. First Roman Christian emperors and Arab Muslim 
caliphs made homosexuality illegal and punishable by death, as was stated above in the historical 
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review. Thus, homosexuals were excluded from the social life and became invisible, but religious 
preaches against them m in the contrary, flourished. Thus, homonegativity was spread widely in the 
society, but positive ATH were not heard since no one could defend homosexuals, because 
homosexual activity itself is illegal and any attempts to justify it could be considered criminal 
offences as well. In addition, there is a negative impact with regard to ATH on associative 
evaluation and propositional reasoning. The mere existence of the negative stereotypes about 
homosexuals rooted in different cultures by religion, created automatic negative association with 
homosexuality among the population, according to APE model discussed above. The absence of 
any positive associations because of homosexual hiding in a closet only made things worse.  
Imagine now a different situation – how ATH would be shaped in the modern Western 
society. There, homonegative speeches and opinions are not banned, but homosexual activity is 
legal in majority of the countries, gay people could demonstrate their sexuality openly, and, more 
important, could defend themselves in public space. Therefore, the familiarity heuristics began to 
play its role. Homosexuals were reintroduced in Western society and familiarized to the public after 
they left their closet. Thus, nowadays in the Western society any particular person could see who 
gay people really are, and it would be not so easy for religion leaders to make people believe in any 
accusations against them. Western media report homosexuality as mundane issue, TV series and 
movies include gay characters more and more often, celebrities reveal their sexuality publicly by 
―coming outs‖ – in all this environment, homosexuals became more and more familiar to the 
population. Moreover, in person‘s closest circles homosexuals exist openly nowadays – as friends 
and acquaintances, classmates and colleagues, neighbors and family members…Close acquaintance 
with real gay person could work better against prejudices and homonegativity than any justification 
of homosexuality based on science or morality. However, the latter is also widespread in the 
western societies nowadays: more and more scientists, politicians and even religion leaders speak 
for homosexuality. That could make an expertise heuristics mechanism work as well. In addition, 
APE model also predicts the attitude change: since homosexuals became more and more familiar to 
the public, many new positive associations are created which could overturn old negative 
stereotypes about gay people rooted by religion. However, because of the PAST model effect, the 
ambiguity ATH would linger for a while until societal ATH will be completely changed. 
What could we derive from this? Firstly, legislation and legal framework matters. To make 
homosexuality illegal and, thus, to silence gay people and to make them invisible, is a very effective 
way to spread homonegativity in a society. In the contrary, legal framework which allows gay 
people to live openly could create more positive ATH in a society. Legislation matters also with a 
respect to religion. Thus, legislation based on religion, like sharia law, allows religion leaders to 
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sentence homosexuals to prison or even to death, while secular legislation excludes any influence of 
church on the law.  
Second important factor is a dominant public discourse about homosexuality in a particular 
society. This factor is highly correlated with previous one, legislation, since in the countries which 
criminalize homosexuality it is hardly possible to have any public discourse about homosexuality 
except negative one. However, there are many countries which do not punish people for 
homosexual activity but also do not recognize gay marriages and do not protect gay people from 
discrimination (as in many Eastern Europe countries). In these societies, public discourse might 
matter. The public discourse about homosexuality is determined by ideology. Thus, the main factor 
responsible for shaping positive ATH is an exposure to the western liberal ideology, represented by 
the Western media. In the contrary, an exposure to a homonegative ideology, like Communism or 
monotheistic religion (either Islam or Christianity), represented by religious preaches or Communist 
government propaganda, is a key factor in shaping negative ATH.  
We could test all of these hypotheses in the model. Before it, let us explain what and how 
we will exactly test. We will observe the effects of familiarity and expertise heuristics in shaping 
ATH. Our hypotheses there will be: 
 
H1: More familiar a particular person with homosexuals, more positive ATH she will 
express (familiarity heuristics).  
 
We should note, however, that familiarity, or mere exposure effect, does not mean that all 
personal experiences with homosexuals should necessarily be positive experiences. Homosexuals, 
as all other groups of people, come in all varieties, and life situations can be very different either. 
There could be, for instance, sexual harassment of straight men by gay men, or just some problems 
with homosexuals which do not relate to their sexuality, but to their personality. However, 
familiarity hypothesis stated that, despite all of these possible varieties of situations, in general the 
effect of mere exposure of any particular person to homosexuals on this person‘s ATH is positive. 
Why? Firstly, familiarity destroys the ―fear of the stranger‖, the xenophobic effect which otherwise 
might take place. For instance, when we get to know gay people as our neighbors, colleagues, 
friends, relatives, we see that they are the same human beings as we are, with their own advantages 
and flaws. It is hard to believe that they are ―messengers of hell‖ or ―horned demons‖ as religious 
propaganda might claim and, in the absence of real evidence, it would be difficult to disapprove 
these claims, even ridiculous as they are. If we know homosexuals as real people from our social 
environments, it would be more difficult for us to believe exaggerated antigay propaganda, like ―all 
homosexuals are pedophiles‖, etc. We might find our gay neighbor not the best neighbor in the 
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world, but not a monster though, as religious homonegative propaganda might depict this person. 
Therefore, familiarity effect means that in general more exposed we are to experiences with 
homosexuals in our lives, irrespective positive or negative ones, more positive our ATH are. It is 
because the ―fear of the stranger‖, the xenophobic effect disappears in presence of familiarity. 
However, the opposite claim ―less familiar a particular person with homosexuals, more 
homonegative her attitudes are‖ is a controversial one since the mere lack of familiarity with gay 
persons does not necessarily mean homonegativity in the absence of anti-gay propaganda, for 
instance. 
 
H2: More frequently a particular person is exposed to homonegative speeches and more 
confidence she has in it, more homonegative this person is (expertise heuristics).  
 
It is worth to note that when an exposure to anti-gay propaganda is combined with the 
absence of homosexuals in a public life, e.g., lack of familiarity with them, the impact of 
homonegative speeches is stronger. It is because negative expertise effect is combined with 
xenophobic effect here.  
 
How could we test these hypotheses? There are several ways to test familiarity hypothesis. 
Thus, we could try to observe the impacts of having gay friends or relatives on people‘ ATH. Either 
way we might be tempted to test the effect of coming-outs of famous celebrities on ATH. However, 
we do not have any available data from the surveys which ask questions like ―Do you have gay 
friends or gay relatives?‖ or ―Are any of your favorite celebrities are gay?‖ Thus, we could not 
measure these effects directly. It could be a question for the next research, however, to conduct an 
experiment, where treatment group are people who actually have gay friends and relatives and 
control group are people who does not have them. For this paper, nevertheless, the legal framework 
could be a proxy to this issue: if a certain country recognizes gay rights and allows gay people to be 
open, we could claim that the citizens of his country have more opportunities to know real gay 
people, than in the country when homosexuality is illegal. Therefore, we could claim that legal 
recognition of homosexuality and gay rights has a lingering positive effect in shaping ATH. We 
could use the legal index from Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) as a measure of it. According to 
their results, legal index is one of the important predictors of ATH, and, using it as proxy to 
familiarity, we could claim, that familiarity plays its role in shaping ATH. However, familiarity 
effect is not so explicit here, since legal recognition of gay rights might facilitate issues for gay 
people in other ways as well – by providing more open space for advocating for gay rights, by 
granting some protection from discrimination, etc. In addition, it is not perfectly clear whether legal 
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recognition of gay rights precedes societal value change or it is other way around, as Inglehart 
argued. Jäckle and Wenzelburger‘s results could suggest at least some causality between their legal 
index and societal ATH, however. In addition, this legal index at least to some extent could be a 
proxy to familiarity too, since legal recognition of gay rights and protection of homosexuals from 
discrimination creates opportunities for gay people to be open in the public space (since it is not 
punishable by law to be gay anymore) and therefore increases visibility of homosexuals in society 
in general.  
Other way to test familiarity hypothesis might be to measure the effect of the exposure to 
Western media in general which more and more often broadcast TV shows, series and movies with 
gay characters. The idea behind it is that if general public who is supposedly not so familiar with 
homosexual people in general, might be familiarized with them by watching some popular TV show 
or series. The main criteria to choose these TV shows, series and movies might be following: they 
should be indeed very popular among the whole population and not explicitly gay-friendly like 
Queer as Folk or Brokeback Mountain but they should have gay characters or gay themes. 
Mechanism here is following: people with homonegative views would probably not watch a 
particular show (like Queer as Folk) knowing beforehand that it is actually a gay show, but if they 
do not know it from the beginning and already start to watch and then get to know gay characters 
there, it might actually change their perceptions of gay people in general. Thus, we could try to test 
the familiarity heuristics effect: the mere exposure to gay characters in these shows could in theory 
change public ATH. Therefore, we could split our first hypothesis into two separate ones: 
 
H3: A legal framework which granted homosexuals with some rights and made them easier 
to demonstrate their sexuality openly in public space, contributes to a change of ATH to the better. 
H4: A mere exposure to TV shows, series and movies which include gay characters, 
contributes to a change of ATH to the better. 
 
However, empirical test of second hypothesis proved to be somewhat troublesome. Firstly, it 
was not that easy to collect the relevant data since television networks and channels, for instance, 
normally do not provide the list of countries where they broadcast which could be used in our cross-
country analysis. Secondly, it turned out that some countries where homosexuality is illegal, either 
banned TV shows which contains gay characters, or remade them and cut the gay characters out. 
For instance, the last thing happened to popular show Modern Family in Iran. Thus, Iranian TV 
remade the show frame by cutting gay characters out.
105New Disney version of ―Beauty and the 
Beast‖ which contains a gay scene, was banned in Kuwait, and has been given ―adults only‖ 
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ranking in Russia.
106
 There were attempts to ban it in Malaysia also, but eventually, after public 
backlash and criticism, Malaysian government allowed film to screening.
107
 However, other films 
related to LGBT topic, were previously banned in Malaysia.
108
All these facts demonstrate that it is 
highly probable that countries where homosexuality is illegal, would try to either ban or remade TV 
shows and series which contains gay characters. Therefore, it made no sense to test a familiarity 
hypothesis based on exposure to gay characters in TV shows since TV shows with gay characters 
are allowed in the societies which already gave legal recognition for gay rights and not allowed in 
the countries which still do not recognize gay rights. However, it again highlights the importance of 
the legal index as a proxy to familiarity. Thus, legal recognition of LGBT means that society 
became familiarized with homosexual and absence of this recognition causes invisibility of gay 
people to general public, turning them into strangers susceptible to homonegative speeches. In other 
words, in the countries where homosexuality is illegal, society is not familiar with gay people but is 
familiar with homonegative speeches about them. This issue leads us to other effect that could be 
tested in our analysis – expertise heuristics effect.  
As for an expertise heuristics effect, we should measure the effect of religious and 
Communist anti-gay propaganda. As for religion, how could we measure this exposure using our 
data? Personal religiosity and importance of religion in someone‘s life does not necessarily mean 
that this person is exposed to religious propaganda. People could be internally religious and place 
their confidence on holy texts and not on churches and religious leaders. In this case, they might 
have different views on homosexuality than externally religious people who trusts churches and 
priests and are exposed to their propaganda. At least, we might expect that internally religious 
people are less influenced by a religious propaganda in general and in question of homosexuality in 
particular. In our data, we could use variable ―Confidence: Churches‖ as a determinant of external 
religiosity and exposure to religious antigay propaganda. We will discuss this issue in details when 
we will speak of our data and our independent variables in particular. 
Exposure to a Communist propaganda is harder to measure, however. This is because many 
societies which were Communist in the past, now transformed into democracies, and, therefore, we 
could not observe the effects of Communist propaganda there anymore. Other Communist societies 
as China or North Korea nowadays are dictatorships more or less isolated from the world, and it is 
hard to gather any data related to our variables of interest there. However, we have empirical 
evidence from Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) that (-post) Communism is indeed an important 
predictor of homonegativity. Thus, based on their research, we could again test this claim using 
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their results. However, since the hypothesis about religion we will discuss in more details in next 
chapter, let us for now formulate only one hypothesis about Communist ideology: 
 
 H5: Communism or Communist legacy in a particular country contributes to homonegative 
attitudes in this country. 
 
This hypothesis was already tested by Jäckle and Wenzelburger in their research, as was 
mentioned above. Their results suggest that Communism and Communist legacy is a strong 
predictor of homonegativity. We could only extend their argument by adding expertise heuristics 
effect there. Thus, we could highlight the mechanism behind Communist influence on 
homonegativity. It was Communist ideology and homonegative propaganda by Communist 
governments which run the expertise heuristics mechanism and changed population‘s ATH to the 
worst. In addition, by making homosexuality illegal in Soviet Union in 1934, Stalin excluded 
homosexuals from public visibility, therefore making familiarity effect to work against them too.
109
  
In this section we used theoretical background from social psychology to understand the 
mechanism of shaping ATH. It was argued that two separate effects – familiarity heuristics and 
expertise heuristics – are at play there. Familiarity effect was proved difficult to be tested 
empirically but we used legal index from Jäckle and Wenzelburger as a proxy to it. To measure 
expertise heuristics, we split it into two parts – Communism and religious homonegative 
propaganda‘s effects. As for Communism, its effect on ATH was also already tested by Jäckle and 
Wenzelburger. We will conduct our own analysis, however, to test the expertise heuristics 
hypothesis with regard to religion and religious homonegative propaganda. Our main research 
interest lies in the complicated relations between religion and homosexuality. Our historical review 
suggested a very important role which monotheistic world religions – Islam and Christianity, in 
particular – played into changing ATH to the worst after Roman Empire was converted to 
Christianity and Arab caliphate had risen. Our literature review demonstrated that religion, personal 
religiosity and religious denomination are the strongest predictors of homonegativity in the world. 
We will try to understand the mechanism behind shaping of negative ATH by world religions by 
using global data coming from all over the world. 
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5. Data and Methodology 
 
The data for this research comes from World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values 
Study (EVS). WVS which was started in 1981 as a part of EVS is a global research project which 
includes nationally representative surveys from almost 100 countries. Abovementioned Ronald 
Inglehart is a director of WVS. As it said on WVS site, ―the WVS is the largest non-commercial, 
cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed, currently 
including interviews with almost 400,000 respondents. Moreover the WVS is the only academic 
study covering the full range of global variations, from very poor to very rich countries, in all of the 
world‘s major cultural zones‖.110 What is more important for our research, WVS and EVS data also 
includes a couple of questions about homosexuality which we will use as dependent variables in our 
model. 
For this research, integrated longitudinal datasets from both WVS and EVS which cover 
survey results from the four waves of the EVS (1981-2008) and the six waves of the WVS (1981-
2014), were chosen.
111
 This dataset include data from more than 100 countries. We will use both 
EVS and WVS datasets since not so many European countries are represented in the WVS data, and 
we need both sources to have a comprehensive picture. In addition, EVS data contains one question 
about homosexuals which is missed in WVS data – about child adoption by homosexual couples. 
Time-series of more than thirty years for the available data allows us to explore the time differences 
in societal ATH, and to observe the directions of the global trend of these value changes. In 
addition, we will add the last, 6
th
 wave of WVS from 2010 to 2014 in the last part of our analysis to 
have as comprehensive data as possible.  
 
5.1. Dependent Variables 
 
Our main dependent variable would be ―Justifiable: Homosexuality‖, which is an ordinal 
variable ranked from 1 (―Never Justifiable‖) to 10 (―Always Justifiable‖). This variable should 
capture general ATH, as it was done before in abovementioned papers. For the cross-check, we will 
use two more dependent variables to compare our results with. Second one will be ―Neighbors: 
Homosexuals‖, which is a binary variable with value 1 (―Mentioned‖), which means that person 
would not like to have homosexuals as neighbors, and value 2 (―Not Mentioned‖), which means 
that person would not mind to have homosexuals as neighbors. This variable is a measure of social 
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distance from homosexuals. The important difference between these two variables is their different 
focus. First variable captures disapproval of homosexuality as a kind of human sexual behavior and 
way of life in general, while second variable demonstrates attitudes towards real gay people. This 
difference might appear to be significant. For example, some person may disapprove of homosexual 
behavior but does not mind to interact with gay people, however. Other person might respect the 
right of homosexuals to live their lives according to their sexuality but for some reasons would not 
like to interact with these people still. Thus, cross-check for the results from both of these variables 
is required. 
In addition, we will pick a third dependent ordinal variable ―Homosexual Couples – Adopt 
Children‖, which ranks from 1 (―Strongly agree‖ (with adoption of children by homosexual 
couples)) to 5 (―Strongly disagree‖), from the EVS data. This variable included only in the EVS 
data and does not exist in the WVS dataset. Therefore, we will not be able to draw full comparisons 
between results from this variable and previous two ones. However, the insights that this last 
variable could give us are also important. 
This third variable could help to capture, to which extent people are ready to accept 
homosexuality. Thus, even if public opinion towards homosexuality significantly changed for the 
better during last twenty years, the question of child adoption by same-sex couples still remains ―a 
bone of contestation‖ in popular discourse, for instance, in US.112Therefore, many people may be 
ready to accept homosexuality as a normal part of human life, and, moreover, would not mind to 
have homosexuals as neighbors, but they may fail to accept child adoption by homosexual couples. 
Therefore, it would be useful to have insights from this third variable to realize, whether 
homosexuality is fully accepted in contemporary societies or still not. We should note also that data 
for the third variable comes from Europe. Thus, we deal with one of the most accepting of 
homosexuality region in the world. If, despite of this fact, results would show us the low level of 
acceptance of child adoption by homosexual couples in Europe, it will be an important issue to 
ponder about.  
 
5.2. Independent Variables 
 
As for independent variables, it was decided to pick up religious variables as main 
explanatory variables of interest. However, the effect of general religiosity and religious 
denomination was well enough measured in previous researches. What was not captured before, it is 
the effect of religious attendance and confidence in churches has on our dependent variables. The 
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level of confidence in churches and religious institutions, same as the frequency of attendance of 
religious services, are our means to test our second hypothesis – expertise heuristics. Expertise 
heuristics effect means that confidence in authorities (in this case – religious authorities) might 
affect personal ATH. Confidence in religious institutions is an exact measure of expertise effect, 
frequency of religious attendance is a proxy. Why is it a proxy? Well, while attending religious 
services, believers are exposed to preaches and other speeches by their local religious officers 
(priests, imams, etc.) which might affect their personal beliefs and views. If there are any 
homonegative speeches during religious services, it might affect personal ATH of the attendants. In 
addition, people who attend religious services on a regular basis might also be more tightly 
connected with their religious community, and this might affect their personal attitudes and beliefs, 
including ATH, too, because if the majority of the religious community shared homonegative 
views, the minority who does not share them might be forced to do it by peer pressure mechanism, 
etc. 
The measure of religious attendance was considered by Adamczyk and Pitt (2009, p. 343) 
but was rejected by the authors because they were concerned with over-specifying their model with 
too many moderately correlated independent religious variables. Adamczyk and Pitt used 
importance of religion and religion denomination as their independent variables. Since we will not 
use them in our first model, we could try to test the effect of religious attendance on our dependent 
variables.  
As a measure of religious attendance, we had chosen the variable ―How often do you attend 
religious services?‖ from our merged WVS and EVS dataset. This is an ordinal variable which is 
ranked from 1 (―More than once a week‖) to 8 (―Never practically never‖). We considered use 
variables ―Active Church Membership‖ and ―Voluntary work for religious organization‖ too as a 
measure of religious activity, but they turned out to be almost not correlated with our dependent 
variables during correlation analysis. Therefore, these variables were rejected. With religious 
attendance, our hypothesis based on expertise heuristics effect, is that more often a particular person 
attends religious services, more homonegative she is.  
 
H6: More frequently a particular person attends religious services, more homonegative this 
person is.  
 
As for confidence in churches, previous researches had shown that Muslim religion 
denomination is one of the strongest predictors of homonegativity. Does it mean, however, that 
Islam as religion is necessarily much more homonegative than Christianity? Actually, it does not. 
The case might be that religion leaders and preachers have more influence on the population in the 
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Muslim world, than in Christian world. Thus, we know that most of the Western Christian 
democracies are secular countries with secular legislation, while many Muslim countries have 
religious, sharia legislation, and some of them are even ruled by religion leaders (as Iran). 
Therefore, it is important not only what a certain religion tells about homosexuality, but also how 
much authority and influence this religion and church actually has in a particular society.  
Thus, we are now approaching our expertise heuristics from the other angle. We will 
investigate which effect confidence in religious institutions has on homonegativity. We might 
expect that for religious believers, the statements and preaches of religious leaders against 
homosexuality will play an important role in shaping their homonegative attitudes. And the religion 
leaders often do speak against homosexuality. For example, in Catholicism Pope Benedict XVI 
preached against homosexuality in a strict disapproving way.
113
The Pope might have a certain 
authority to Catholic believers, though. Muslim religious leaders preach against homosexuality on a 
regular basis, identifying so-called ―gay plight‖ with decadent Western influence114. For example, 
even in 2016 the Tunisian imam called to kill homosexuals by ―stoning them to death‖.115More 
noticeably, Islam religious leaders preach against homosexuals even in the West. Thus, imam in 
Florida when he spoke in the mosque in 2016 (actually, just before the Orlando shooting) called the 
killing of homosexuals an ―act of compassion‖.116 Therefore, we could observe that religious and 
church leaders, Muslim imams in particular, speak against homosexuality quite frequently. If 
common religious believers are listening to them, it might contribute a great deal to their 
homonegativity.  
There are a couple of questions in WVS and EVS about how much confidence a particular 
person feels in churches (religious institutions) and religious leaders. These questions reflect the 
authority which religious leaders and churches have for particular individuals. It could capture the 
expertise heuristics effect then. Thus, we could observe whether or not the religious leaders and 
their preaches could affect personal ATH in a negative way. There are two variables in our merged 
EVS-WVS   dataset which measure this confidence – ―Confidence: Churches‖ and ―Confidence: 
Religious Leaders‖. The latter one turned out to be insignificant after correlation analysis, however. 
The first variable, ―Confidence: Churches‖, in the contrary, is moderately correlated with our 
dependent variables and turned out to be significant during regression analysis. Therefore, we will 
use this variable as a second measure of expertise heuristics effect in our analysis (first one is the 
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frequency of religious attendance, as we remember). ―Confidence: Churches‖ is an ordinal variable 
which is ranked from 1 (―A great deal‖) to 4 (―Not at all‖).  
Our hypothesis there, again based on expertise heuristics effect, is that more confidence a 
particular person feels in churches, more homonegative this person is.  
 
H7: More confidence in churches a particular person feels, more homonegative her attitudes 
are.  
 
In addition, we decided to include the measure of personal religiosity in our analysis too, 
since it is indeed a very important predictor of ATH. However, we will not use variables ―How 
important God is in your life?‖ and ―Importance of religion in life‖ since both of them were used 
multiple times in other research. Instead of it, we decided to use another measure of religiosity – an 
ordinal variable ―Religious Person‖ which is ranked from ―1‖ (religious person) through ―2‖ (not a 
religious person) to 3 (―a convinced atheist‖). This variable is important from several points of 
view. Firstly, it could demonstrate the respondents‘ self-estimation of their religiosity, which might 
not necessarily concur with their actual level of religiosity but still matters. Secondly, here we could 
capture the possible impact of atheism on ATH. We already know that atheism considered a 
predictor of tolerance towards homosexuality, so we could test this claim by using this variable as 
well. 
 
5.3. Control Variables 
 
Religious variables are the explanatory variables of our main interest but we will use also set 
of control variables. Sociology theories tell that some personal differences, e.g., age, gender, 
income and education, may play a role in shaping attitudes about morality in general and 
homosexuality in particular (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Thus, demographic characteristics, in 
particular younger age (Britton, 1990; Hayes, 1995; Herek & Gonzalez-Rivera, 2006; Michael et 
al., 1999; Kuntz et al., 2015; Wojcieszak & Price, 2010) and female gender (Berkman & Zinberg, 
1997; Finlay & Walther, 2003; Hudson & Ricketts, 1980; Kelley, 2001, p. 18; Loftus, 2001; Poteat 
& Mereish, 2012; van den Akker et al., 2012) are associated with higher degree of acceptance of 
homosexuality. We have a lot of theoretical and empirical evidence which tell us that higher 
education (Hayes, 1995; Herek & Gonzalez-Rivera, 2006; Lambert, Ventura, Hall, & Cluse-Tolar, 
2006; Loftus, 2001; van den Akker et al., 2012; Wojcieszak & Price, 2010), and also higher income 
and social status (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994; Six, 2009) related to 
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more accepting ATH as well. However, marital status (married people tend to be more 
homonegative) and size of the family (bigger families are more homonegative either) play a negative 
role in shaping ATH (Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009; Herek and Glunt 1993; Herek & Capitanio, 1995). 
Therefore, we will use all of these variables as controls. There was some research linked 
immigrants and immigration in EU with negative ATH (Röder, 2015; Simon 2008; Stulhofer and 
Rimac 2009; Gerhards 2010; Van den Akker, Van der Ploeg, and Scheepers 2012). However, since 
this research was done only for Europe and, moreover, it was stated that immigration plays negative 
role in shaping ATH only in EU (with flow of Muslim immigrants into EU in particular), and since 
we have the world data, it was decided not to use these variables. 
Speaking of our controls, it would be useful to refer again to the abovementioned research 
by Pew Research Center. In their report, PRC also found correlation between age, gender and views 
on homosexuality.
117
 For example, their findings show that in general women are more tolerant 
towards homosexuality than men, and that gender gap on acceptance of homosexuality is ranged 
from 10 to 17 percent.
118
Speaking about age and views on homosexuality, PRC report demonstrates 
that in general, young people (18-29) are tend to be more tolerant towards homosexuality, than 
middle-aged (30-49) and old people (50+). The hugest age gaps on acceptance of homosexuality 
could be seen in South Korea (71% of young people accepted homosexuality versus 16% of old 
people), Japan (83% vs. 39%) and Brazil (74% vs. 46%). In Europe and North America, the largest 
age gaps are observed in US (72% vs. 52%), Italy (86% vs. 67%) and Greece (66% vs. 40%). 
However, in other countries the age gap is relatively slight, and especially it is the issue when it 
comes to the nations which rejected homosexuality – the percentage of rejection is large and 
relatively same among all age groups. In Uganda and Malaysia, even inverse situation is observed 
when young people are less tolerant towards homosexuality than old people (only 3% of young 
people in Uganda accepted homosexuality versus 7% of old people, 7% vs. 11% in Malaysia). 
Thus, we should bear this in mind when we will test the impact of age in our own model. 
As a measure of gender, we use binary variable ―Sex‖ from our dataset where ―1‖ = Male 
and ―2‖ = Female. For age, we use an ordinal variable decoded into several categories with an 
interval of ten years for each age category. This division should let us capture the predicted 
difference in ATH between young and old people and trace all the impact age has on ATH. For 
marital status, we use a binary variable ―Legally married to a partner‖ with ―0‖ = No and ―1‖ = Yes. 
To measure the size of the family, we use the question about how many children respondents had. 
This is an ordinal variable with ranked from 0 (no children) to ―8 and more‖. The indicator of 
education we take from the question ―Highest educational level attained‖. The answers are ranked 
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from ―1‖ = Incomplete elementary education‖ to ―8‖ = University with degree. To measure the 
income level, we considered use quantitative measure of income (e.g., weekly, monthly or annual 
household income) in euros, but we rejected the idea because this measure is incorrect in terms of 
comparability, since in different parts of the world the same amount of euros means actually a 
different amount of money, due to different values of national currencies. Thus, one hundred euros 
could mean much more money in India than in Finland, for instance. Therefore, an ordinal variable 
―Income level‖ which is ranked from ―1‖ = Low, through ―2‖ = Medium to ―3‖ = High, was chosen. 
Since social class was considered important in shaping ATH by some researchers (Hout, Manza, 
and Brooks, 1993
119
; Andersen and Heath, 2003
120
) we decided to choose an ordinal variable 
―Socio-economic status of respondent‖ to check this hypothesis. Hout, Manza, and Brooks stated a 
particular importance of the difference between manual working class and nonmanual labor 
(managers, clerks and other nonmanual workers), and not only between upped, middle and lower 
social classes. Andersen and Fetner (2008
121
) stated that social class might be an important 
predictor of homonegativity, at least in Western democracies. Therefore, we will include this 
―Socio-economic status of respondent‖ variable into our analysis. This variable is structured in that 
way that will allow us to capture not only the difference in ATH between upper and lower social 
classes, but also between manual and nonmanual, skilled and unskillful labor force. Those in a 
summary are the most important individual level predictors of ATH suggested by the researchers. 
This ―Socio-economic status of respondent‖ is an ordinal variable ranked as following: ―1‖ for 
upper class, ―2‖ for middle class of nonmanual workers, ―3‖ for skilled manual workers and ―4‖ for 
the unskilled ones. Our prediction is that upper class should be the most accepting of homosexuality 
and that manual unskilled working class – the least accepting.  
 
5.4. Model 
 
Formally, our model of measuring ATH looks like that: 
Y = β0 + β1 (confidence to churches) + β2 (religious attendance) + β3 (religiosity) + β4 
(gender) + β5 (age) + β6 (marital status) + β7 (number of children) + β8 (educational level) + β9 
(income level) + β10 (socio-economic status) + ε,  
Where Y is a dependent variable (Y is different in three different models, it is ―justifiable: 
homosexuality‖ for the first model, ―neighbors: homosexuals‖ for the second one and ―homosexual 
couples: adopt children‖ for the last one), and ε – an error term. 
                                                          
119
 Hout, Brooks and Manza 1993:259-77 
120
 Andersen and Heath 2003: 301–327 
121
 Andersen and Fetner 2008: 942–958 
41 
 
For each of three models, we will conduct a multiple regression analysis. We should note 
also that three different models will be run as three different types of regressions, according to the 
nature of each dependent variable. Variable for justification of homosexuality is an ordinal, but 
because it takes as much as ten different values, we could safely run linear regression for that 
model
122
. As for social distance towards homosexuals, which is measured by a binary variable 
―Neighbors: Homosexuals‖, we will run a binary logistic regression. At last, for the third model, we 
will use ordinal logistic regression, since the third dependent variable ―Homosexual Couples: 
Adopt Children‖ is an ordinal variable which takes five different values from 1 to 5 (which is not a 
sufficient number to replace ordinal logistic regression with a linear one)
123
. 
 
5.5. Limitations 
 
We are aware of the limitations of our data and models however. Thus, the data from EVS 
exist only until 2008, so it would be impossible to make comparisons between EVS and WVS 
datasets for the last, 6
th
 WVS wave from 2010 to 2014. It would be equally impossible to use 
integrated longitudinal datasets until 2014 from both surveys, since data for EVS do not exist after 
2008. Therefore, we will use integrated datasets from both EVS and WVS only from 1981 to 2008, 
and data from the last WVS wave of 2010 – 2014will be added later for cross-check. In addition, 
the variable ―Neighbors: Homosexuals‖ was not observed in the first waves of both surveys, so for 
the second model we will have data only from 1990. Speaking of the third model, the question 
about child adoption by homosexual couples is asked only in EVS, so we will not be able to draw 
full comparisons between this last model based only on EVS data, and the previous two models. 
There are other limitations for data as well – for example, still not all countries are observed in 
these surveys (even if quite many of them, compared to Pew Research Center report, for instance), 
fewer number of countries participated in the EVS and WVS during the first waves that during the 
last ways, some data for each variable are missing, etc.  
In addition, it is important to bear in mind, that EVS and WVS are surveys of public 
opinion, and that they could tell us only about what people think of homosexuality. It is important 
to take into consideration the fact that respondents‘ opinions presented in WVS and EVS might not 
always reflect personal true opinions. Thus, if homosexuality is illegal in a certain country and 
punished with a death penalty, respondents might be afraid to reveal their ATH if it is actually not 
negative. In addition, it is impossible in our data to determine whether the respondent herself is 
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homosexual or not which actually could affect her answer. However, even the data we have does 
not give us overall picture of homosexuality acceptance in particular society. Thus, we do not use 
here any official data about number of same-sex marriages (or registered partnerships) contracted in 
particular country/region, or any criminal statistics about number of crimes committed against 
LGBT people, etc. We also lack questions about gay friends and gay relatives and therefore we are 
unable to test familiarity hypothesis. What we can do however – to measure public opinion on 
homonegativity level, on social distance towards homosexuals and on societal attitudes towards 
child adoption by homosexual couples from the largest sample we were able to gather. 
For now, it is worth to note also, that we are aware of the limitations which placed upon our 
analysis by the use of ordinal and logistic regressions. Because these variables are usually ranked 
relatively casually, we could not know, strongly speaking, to which extent dependent variable 
would change when independent variable changes by one, as we could in standard linear regression 
models. Therefore, our regression models would be informative only about the signs of the 
regression coefficients, and not about their exact values. Thus, we could be aware only of general 
direction of causality, but not of the strength of the effect of independent variable on dependent one 
which is determined by the value of regression coefficient. However, it is the only possible way to 
deal with ordinal and binary dependent variables which we have in our data. Personal attitudes are 
hard to measure quantitatively, though.  
6. Results and Discussion 
6.1. Cross-Country Descriptive Analysis 
 
First of all, we made a cross-country descriptive statistics analysis for each of our three 
variables of interest. In other words, we computed descriptive statistics (e.g., number of 
observations, means and standard deviations) for each of our dependent variables, split it by 
countries and, thus, compared countries by its means. The results are presented in tables 1-3 and 
figures 1-3. It is worth to notice that for the first two variables, ―Justifiable: Homosexuality‖ and 
―Neighbors: Homosexuals‖, we have data from both WVS and EVS datasets (to be precise, from 
111 countries for the first variable and for some reason only from 109 for the second one), whereas 
for the last variable, ―Homosexual Couples: Adopt Children) we have data only from 46 European 
countries (including Turkey and Northern Cyprus). We had done a descending and ascending 
sorting of all data presented in the tables by its mean values in that way which allows to represent 
the most tolerant attitudes in the beginning and the most homonegative ones – in the end. Thus, for 
the first variable we started from Andorra with its score of 8.24 representing the most accepting 
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attitude, and finished with Egypt with its score of 1.01 representing the most homonegative attitude. 
In the end of each table we put the medium score (average mean for this variable) and total number 
of observations for all countries. For the graphs, the data was sorted in the same way to demonstrate 
clearer how ATH are divided by countries.  
In addition, it is worth to note that here we computed the country means from all available 
waves of WVS from 1981 to 2014 and EVS from 1981 to 2008. Thus, if, for example, for a certain 
country we have values from each wave, the mean value for all of these waves was computed and 
presented here. If, however, for a certain country the data only from one wave was available, this 
only score is presented here. To cross-check all of these cases, we also computed country means 
split by the time periods (e.g., separately for each wave), to observe how ATH were changed in a 
certain country through time. These result tables are not included in the main analysis, however, 
because of the lack of space, but they are available in the Appendix. It is again worth to note, that 
for the last variable, ―Homosexual Couples: Adopt Children‖, the data only from the last wave 
(2008) is available since this question was not asked in the previous EVS waves. For the most of the 
countries, however, we have data from different waves, and mean value was computed, as was 
stated before. For some countries, however, data came only from the one wave, the one year. For 
these countries, we put the year from which data came from, in brackets in our tables. This notion is 
important because if, say, we have data from a certain country only for 2001 or even 1996, we 
could not be sure how ATH were changed in this country during last years, and could not make 
valid comparisons with countries which have data for 2008 or even 2014. Let us start analyze our 
variables of interest one by one, however, with all limited data we have. For details with data split 
by years, all who are interested are welcome to see Appendix. 
For the variable, ―Justifiable: Homosexuality‖, Andorra turned out to be the most accepting 
country with score of 8.24 (when the maximum score is 10) and the least accepting country is Egypt 
with score of 1.01 (when the minimum score is 1). However, the data from Andorra came from 
2005 and from Egypt – from 2001, so we might expect that something might have changed in these 
countries by now. Although with the data we have, Andorra and Egypt are leader and anti-leader in 
our score. However, one disturbing issue could be noticed from the data. Andorra is followed by 
Netherlands with score of 7.33 and Sweden with score of 6.99, and then Luxembourg with score of 
6.24 already. The maximum score for homosexuality acceptance is 10 (―Always justifiable‖), and 
our leaders in terms of homosexuality acceptance are split somewhat between 6 and 8 on their 
score. Thus, no country is ready to accept homosexuality completely, even among the most tolerant 
ones. In the contrary, quite a large list of countries is scored between 1 and 2, very close to the 
minimum score of 1 (―Never justifiable‖). Thus, many countries in the world are still ready to reject 
homosexuality completely, considering it to be ―never justifiable‖. Total score is 3.34 (with number 
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of observations equal to 456 266 individuals), which is far closer to the lowest score 1 (―Never 
Justifiable‖) than to the highest score 10 (―Always Justifiable‖). That signifies that homosexuality is 
still far from being fully accepted in the contemporary world. 
Speaking of our results in general, we found an empirical support for many theoretical 
predictions from literature review already in this simplest descriptive analysis. Thus, Western 
democracies are ranked highest in terms of homosexuality acceptance and the Muslim ones – 
lowest. In addition, Western Europe turned out to be more tolerant than Eastern Europe, as was also 
predicted, and Latin America is scored relatively high too (with Uruguay as leader of 
homosexuality acceptance with its score of 5.31). There are some slight exceptions, however. Thus, 
Israel is ranked surprisingly high even for the data from 2001 – of 4.89, which is better score than 
for Canada (4.79) and Great Britain (4.68). In addition, some Asian non-Muslim countries – 
Philippines, Japan and Hong Kong – are ranked higher than Italy, Ireland and United States, for 
instance. Communist and post-Communist countries along with India are ranked poorly, as was 
predicted, though somewhat better than most of the Muslim ones. Speaking of the latter, we have 
some notable exceptions, however. Thus, Singapore, Lebanon and Mali are scored surprisingly high 
and better than some Eastern European countries (such as Poland, Hungary, Estonia and Lithuania). 
Singapore with its score of 3.08 and Lebanon with score of 3.00 are the most accepting Muslim 
countries in the world, at least according to our data. Lithuania with its score of 1.79 (far below 
even some Muslim countries) is the most homonegative country in Europe and Georgia with its 
score of 1.30 is the most homonegative Christian country in the world.  
These results are very interesting and important indeed. They confirmed many theoretical 
predictions but also highlighted some notable exceptions. Thus, Andorra as the most accepting 
country went unnoticed in all of the previous researches – probably, because of the small size of this 
country which kept it apart from the interest of the most researchers. As for Lebanon and Mali, we 
could speculate about the reasons behind their high score in terms of homosexuality acceptance. 
Thus, some researchers consider Lebanon one of the most progressive and liberal Arab 
countries.
124
However, it is not the purpose of this analysis to give ad hoc explanations of the results. 
Here, we just draw a general picture (which could be seen clearer in the graphs than in numbers) 
and highlighted some peculiar cases and exceptions. We will deal with them in the main parts of our 
analysis, when we will run regression models and apply our theories to explain ATH and its change 
over time. For now, let us move to the analysis of the second variable of interest.  
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Table 1. Justifiable: homosexuality 
    
Country/region Mean N 
Std. 
Deviati
on 
Country/region Mean N 
Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Andorra (2005) 
8,24 3257 1,751 
Zambia (2007) 
2,62 4173 1,826 
Netherlands 
7,33 2316 1,787 
Estonia 
2,57 2676 3,470 
Sweden 
6,99 996 2,736 
South Korea 
2,52 2501 2,229 
Luxembourg 
6,24 2886 1,205 
India 
2,47 1320 3,040 
Denmark 
6,11 5693 3,318 
Belarus 
2,42 2650 2,840 
Iceland 
6,10 5976 3,394 
Latvia 
2,29 10463 3,032 
Switzerland 
5,91 4303 3,372 
Northern Cyprus 
(2008) 
2,23 4194 2,006 
Norway 
5,65 1199 1,536 
Venezuela 
2,20 2706 1,763 
Germany 
5,41 1457 ,574 
Kazakhstan (2011) 
2,18 1109 1,022 
Uruguay 
5,31 4437 1,547 
Ukraine 
2,17 7434 3,209 
New Zealand 
5,29 6980 3,229 
Russian Federation 
2,11 2615 3,351 
Australia 
5,25 2672 1,830 
Bahrain (2014) 
2,10 6752 1,578 
Finland 
5,10 4612 3,125 
Romania 
2,04 5346 3,680 
Czech Republic 
5,09 4929 2,683 
Moldova 
2,03 3200 ,827 
France 
4,98 6618 2,336 
El Salvador (1999) 
2,03 3753 2,628 
Spain 
4,93 6708 3,296 
Bosnia (1998) 
2,03 3578 2,807 
Israel (2001) 
4,89 5454 3,045 
Serbia 
2,01 7180 2,631 
Canada 
4,79 6670 1,611 
Macedonia 
1,91 3484 2,638 
Great Britain 
4,68 3135 2,855 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1,87 1841 2,770 
Serbia and 
Montenegro (2005) 
4,66 10444 2,828 
Kyrgyzstan 
1,84 1057 1,327 
Austria 
4,64 3618 2,938 
Bosnia Herzegovina 
1,84 7710 2,144 
Belgium 
4,49 2972 2,834 
Albania 
1,84 11235 2,153 
Slovakia 
4,46 482 2,243 
Libya (2014) 
1,82 3019 1,144 
Slovenia 
4,34 7563 3,471 
Lithuania 
1,79 1459 1,120 
Greece 
4,23 4602 3,629 
Viet Nam 
1,77 3766 2,035 
Argentina 
4,22 402 2,972 
Burkina Faso (2007) 
1,76 3474 2,403 
Philippines 
4,02 1197 2,392 
Iraq (2012) 
1,73 5011 3,175 
Japan 
4,02 1217 2,495 
Algeria 
1,70 2239 1,667 
Hong Kong 
3,88 1488 1,412 
Nigeria 
1,69 6139 3,572 
United States 
3,88 5621 2,467 
Montenegro 
1,65 16062 2,695 
Italy 
3,84 5523 3,527 
Uzbekistan (2011) 
1,63 2492 1,447 
Ireland 
3,80 6076 3,266 
China 
1,62 13155 3,378 
Chile 
3,77 6064 1,012 
Turkey 
1,61 6936 3,477 
Brazil 
3,68 947 1,308 
Ghana 
1,58 4796 3,474 
Taiwan 
3,66 14230 3,383 
Zimbabwe 
1,53 2710 2,084 
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Northern Ireland 
3,49 3044 1,579 
Armenia 
1,53 1949 1,820 
Mexico 
3,36 2527 3,089 
Rwanda 
1,52 1087 ,915 
Dominican Rep. 
(1996) 
3,26 993 2,645 
Palestine (2013) 
1,51 7393 1,582 
Cyprus 
3,21 2233 2,755 
Ethiopia (2007) 
1,51 1000 1,140 
Peru 
3,19 6271 2,774 
Yemen (2014) 
1,50 7222 2,074 
Guatemala (2004) 
3,14 3247 3,561 
Iran 
1,39 3383 2,034 
Portugal 
3,10 8672 2,642 
Saudi Arabia (2003) 
1,38 3000 ,146 
Malta 
3,09 2974 1,141 
Azerbaijan 
1,33 7005 3,216 
Puerto Rico 
3,07 5066 1,415 
Qatar (2010) 
1,33 1160 ,803 
Singapore 
3,07 1152 1,500 
Georgia 
1,30 9950 3,180 
Colombia 
3,06 3909 3,080 
Kosovo (2008) 
1,29 1422 1,963 
Croatia 
3,05 1153 3,689 
Uganda (2001) 
1,28 2851 3,394 
South Africa 
3,04 6063 3,144 
Indonesia 
1,28 1484 1,485 
Lebanon (2013) 
3,00 7082 2,986 
Morocco (2011) 
1,26 2364 2,177 
Thailand 
2,98 1500 2,056 
Pakistan 
1,25 654 1,625 
Ecuador (2013) 
2,89 3582 ,687 
Tanzania (2001) 
1,15 1096 3,508 
Bulgaria 
2,89 6976 2,289 
Tunisia (2013) 
1,14 1450 2,548 
Mali (2007) 
2,87 2527 1,811 
Jordan 
1,12 1960 2,948 
Poland 
2,70 1200 2,475 
Bangladesh (2002) 
1,05 779 1,900 
Malaysia 
2,68 4380 2,283 
Egypt (2001) 
1,01 1577 1,257 
Hungary 
2,68 1950 2,071 
Total 
3,34 456266 3,113 
 
   
    
 
The second variable, ―Neighbors: Homosexuals‖ is a measure of social distance from 
homosexuals. This is a binary variable with 1 = ―Mind‖ (to have homosexuals as neighbors) and 0 = 
―Don‘t mind‖. The average score is 0.47 (with number of observations equal to 441 866 
individuals) which is far better than the mean score for previous variable. This result highlights that, 
even if people judge homosexuality strictly, they would not mind as much to interact with 
homosexuals in their social environment. It might mean, among other things, that people, even if 
they judge homosexual activity, might to some extent admit gay people‘s right to have it, and 
therefore do not mind interaction with them. However, we again will avoid any speculations and 
just interpret the results that we got.  
The most accepting country with regard to second variable is again Andorra with its score of 
0.05 and the least accepting is again Egypt with score of 1.00 (maximum level of intolerance in this 
case). However, the scores themselves are somewhat changed. The highest scores of the leaders are 
now much closer to the maximum level of acceptance (say, compare 0.05 to 0) than it was with 
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previous variable, though the lowest scores hit the minimum level of acceptance again. However, it 
again seems that with regard to the social interaction with homosexuals, people tend to be more 
accepting than when it comes to justifiability of homosexuality. We should bear in mind that these 
results might demonstrate greater levels of tolerance due to the binary nature of the variable, 
however. In this case, respondents were left only with two possible options of answers – ―Mind‖ or 
―Not‖, whereas in the previous case they had much more options to define their preferences. Thus, 
if a certain person is not completely ok with homosexuals as neighbors, she still might choose 
―Don‘t mind‖ because she is not against it. In addition, we should remember, that answer ―Don‘t 
mind‖ does not mean that respondents really want to have homosexuals as neighbors, it means that 
they just do not mind it. Still, the difference of values between two variables is notable. 
The leaders in terms of homosexuality acceptance are the same – Andorra, Sweden, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (all Scandinavian countries with slight 
exception of Finland, plus Andorra, Netherlands and Switzerland). However, some things had 
changed. Thus, Luxembourg, which was ranked 4
th
 in previous table, now fell to 14
th
 position, but 
France and Spain, which were less acceptant, now are ranked better. That does not necessarily, 
however, that French and Spanish respondents judge homosexuality stricter than they are willing to 
interact with homosexuals. We should remember that data for the data for the second variable exists 
only from the second wave, from 1990, whereas the data for the first variable exists from 1981. 
That could make the scores for the first variable drag behind the scores of the second one, since the 
very early data must have been more homonegative (because ATH changed to the better over time, 
and they were worse in 1980s than in 1990s even in Europe). For details, see the Appendix.  
However, some notable exceptions we could not explain just by binary nature of the second 
variable or the more recent data we have for it. Thus, a Muslim kingdom surprisingly jumped to the 
10
th
 place in our score, right between France and Spain, leaving many European countries behind. 
In the table 1 Bahrain was ranked very poorly with score of 2.10. Now Bahrain became one of ten 
leaders in terms of homosexuality acceptance. The same change we could observe with some other 
Muslim countries which were ranked very poorly in terms of justifiability of homosexuality, but 
received far better score in terms of social interaction with homosexuals – Pakistan (0.22), 
Bangladesh (0.45) and Iran (0.48). These are indeed very interesting results. Thus, we know that 
two our dependent variables are correlated not perfectly, and that respondents‘ perceptions in terms 
of justifiability of homosexuality and social acceptance of homosexuals might be somewhat 
different. Still, the difference for abovementioned four Muslim countries is too big. These countries 
merely jumped from the one end of the table to another. How could it be possible that population of 
these countries consider homosexuality to be ―never justifiable‖ and still almost do not mind at all 
to interact with homosexuals? Remember, score for Bahrain now is far better than for many 
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Western countries like Finland, for instance. The reason behind this inconsistency could be an 
important question to investigate for the future research.  
There are some inverse cases when countries which demonstrate greater acceptance in terms 
of justifiability, turned out to be less tolerant in terms of social distance. Thus, Japan moved to the 
position of the less tolerant country with score of 0.69, but it could be because data for Japan was 
gathered only for 1990 for this variable. It is very likely that if we had data for other waves of 
WVS, the results would be somewhat different. Other example is Turkey, which was scored not so 
poorly in the table 1 (though not so good either), now moved to the position in the very low end of 
the table 2, next to Egypt and Azerbaijan, the intolerance leaders. However, these differences are 
not so big and significant, as for the abovementioned four Muslim countries which drastically 
changed their attitudes in the second question.  
However, in general results for the second variable are consistent with the results for the 
first one. The leaders are Western countries, then Latin America, then Eastern European and Asian 
non-Muslim countries, and (post-) Communist and Muslim countries drag behind as the least 
tolerant.  
Table 2. Neighbors: Homosexuals     
Country/region Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation Country/region Mean N 
Std. 
Deviat
ion 
Andorra (2005) ,05 3448 ,466 Taiwan ,55 4518 ,439 
Sweden ,08 2482 ,459 Latvia ,55 2794 ,390 
Netherlands ,08 1003 ,220 India ,56 2500 ,479 
Denmark ,08 3004 ,277 Poland ,56 1534 ,473 
Iceland 
,09 5393 ,418 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
,56 2863 ,462 
Norway ,12 4946 ,402 Lebanon (2013) ,59 8990 ,484 
Switzerland ,12 4465 ,463 Macedonia ,59 4510 ,424 
Guatemala (2004) ,16 1200 ,382 Serbia ,60 2774 ,459 
France ,17 3025 ,497 Romania ,61 2451 ,322 
Bahrain (2014) ,18 4587 ,445 Bosnia (1998) ,61 6505 ,272 
Spain ,18 6205 ,383 South Korea ,62 2996 ,389 
Belgium ,18 2663 ,483 Kosovo (2008) ,62 6778 ,415 
New Zealand ,19 4768 ,409 Indonesia ,62 4472 ,321 
Luxembourg ,19 5513 ,499 Venezuela ,62 3200 ,412 
Uruguay ,19 7111 ,469 China ,63 5422 ,499 
Canada ,20 5766 ,399 Ukraine ,63 3600 ,449 
Australia 
,20 5700 ,490 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
,63 6663 ,497 
Germany ,20 7791 ,484 Malaysia ,64 3696 ,477 
Brazil ,21 3245 ,498 Uzbekistan ,65 1884 ,451 
Great Britain ,21 7533 ,464 Palestine (2013) ,65 1060 ,370 
Finland ,22 3615 ,500 Mali (2007) ,66 8144 ,488 
Pakistan 
,22 3017 ,496 
Russian 
Federation 
,67 12486 ,470 
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Argentina ,23 489 ,474 Belarus ,67 3034 ,430 
Ireland ,27 7834 ,471 Albania ,68 3902 ,490 
United States ,28 3313 ,275 Japan (1990) ,69 3482 ,488 
Philippines 
,28 417 ,500 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
(2005) 
,69 5450 ,500 
Puerto Rico ,28 1202 ,487 Yemen (2014) ,69 2495 ,470 
Italy ,29 1254 ,412 Tunisia (2013) ,69 6476 ,493 
Greece ,29 1500 ,383 Algeria ,70 12372 ,495 
Malta ,31 6054 ,498 Montenegro ,70 2502 ,396 
Austria ,31 4715 ,411 Kyrgyzstan ,72 11617 ,382 
Colombia ,31 5098 ,376 Armenia ,73 6467 ,271 
Viet Nam ,33 6184 ,359 Zambia ,73 3707 ,331 
Czech Republic 
,33 1000 ,476 
Kazakhstan 
(2011) 
,73 2721 ,481 
Northern Cyprus 
(2008) 
,34 13267 ,403 
Lithuania 
,74 2001 ,496 
Northern Ireland ,35 3086 ,409 Tanzania (2001) ,74 1205 ,463 
Portugal ,35 2634 ,455 Libya (2014) ,74 12842 ,322 
Thailand ,36 1000 ,365 Uganda (2001) ,75 1002 ,433 
Mexico ,38 2252 ,495 Rwanda ,76 7964 ,484 
Ecuador (2013) ,39 4157 ,499 Moldova ,77 3540 ,492 
Singapore ,39 2425 ,292 Nigeria ,78 3000 ,063 
Chile ,40 10124 ,497 El Salvador (1999) ,78 6161 ,410 
Slovenia ,42 3009 ,485 Ghana ,79 1171 ,438 
Hong Kong ,43 5197 ,500 Iraq (2012) ,80 8053 ,447 
South Africa 
,43 1200 ,398 
Burkina Faso 
(2007) 
,81 1534 ,396 
Cyprus ,44 2831 ,444 Zimbabwe ,81 3000 ,391 
Bangladesh ,45 6454 ,452 Ethiopia (2007) ,82 1500 ,477 
Hungary ,47 1011 ,465 Qatar (2010) ,84 2400 ,484 
Peru ,47 1500 ,442 Georgia ,85 1000 ,464 
Slovakia ,48 3623 ,350 Jordan ,86 1220 ,464 
Iran ,48 4851 ,486 Morocco ,88 1500 ,443 
Croatia ,48 2543 ,447 Turkey ,88 1752 ,476 
Dominican Rep. 
(1996) 
,49 1200 ,493 
Azerbaijan 
,92 800 ,488 
Bulgaria ,53 4586 ,498 Egypt (2001) 1,00 1535 ,485 
Estonia ,55 2131 ,436 Total ,47 441866 ,499 
        
 
For the last variable, ―Homosexual Couples: Adopt Children‖, we have data only from the 
last EVS wave, as was mentioned above. Thus, we will have only European countries (with Turkey 
and Northern Cyprus included) and only 2008-2009 years. This variable is an ordinal one which is 
ranked from 1 = ―Agree Strongly‖ (with child adoption by homosexuals) to 5 = ―Disagree 
Strongly‖). Results are presented in Table 3 and Figure 3. 
The mean score is 3.68, which is again closer to the non-accepting polar of the score, with 
62 177 observations. Number of observations is much smaller because the data came only from 
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Europe and only from the last EVS wave. The most accepting country here is Iceland with score of 
2.10 and the least accepting one is Georgia with score of 4.55. Taking into account that Georgia was 
the most homonegative Christian country in the world in Table 1, and Iceland was ranked as one of 
the most tolerant countries in Tables 1 and 2, these results are not surprising. Andorra is not 
included in this dataset and that is why probably the leader of acceptance now has changed. In 
general, results for this table are consistent with previous ones and confirmed theoretical 
predictions. The Western Europe countries in general and Scandinavian ones in particular (now, 
Finland is in the row with other Scandinavian ones, unlike in previous cases), Eastern European 
countries and Russia drag behind.  
Some notions could be made, however. Thus, Spain is ranked surprisingly high in this table 
– on the 4th place, above Denmark, Norway and Finland. Taking into account that it is a Catholic 
country, and Catholics are tend to be more homonegative than Protestants, this result is rather 
surprising. In addition, if we would take only data for the last wave for previous two variables, 
Spain would be ranked much higher there as well (see Appendix). Having the highest score in terms 
of homosexuality acceptance out of all Catholic countries and far above them, Spain is indeed a 
very interesting case to investigate with this regard, for the future research. Other interesting case 
there is Turkey. This only Muslim country in the table is ranked surprisingly high with its score of 
3.51, just below Switzerland, and above all the Eastern European countries and Russia. Taking into 
consideration that Turkey was ranked very poorly in terms of justifiability of homosexuality and 
even poorer in terms of social distance from homosexuals, its relatively tolerant position with 
regard to child adoption by homosexuals is somewhat puzzling. Thus, in general we considered this 
―child adoption‖ variable to be a measure of greatest acceptance of homosexuality, since, as was 
noted above, even for people who accepted homosexual behavior, the question of child adoption by 
homosexuals is still highly controversial. Therefore, we predicted that results for this variable 
would be more negative, than for the previous ones. In general, this prediction was confirmed. 
Thus, even if for this analysis were taken only European, the most progressive in terms of 
homosexuality acceptance countries, and data came only from 2008-2009, the very recent years, the 
results are still far from perfect. The best score for Iceland is still higher than 2, and the majority of 
countries are ranked between 3 and 5, which means between strong disagreement, disagreement and 
lack of a particular opinion. No country strongly agrees with the idea of child adoption by 
homosexuals, and only one score for Iceland is closer to the agreement than to the lack of any 
position. With this regard, results for Turkey seem even more peculiar.  
 
 
 
51 
 
Table 3. Homosexual couples - adopt children     
Country/region Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Country/region Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Iceland 2,10 1299 1,130 Romania 3,86 1336 ,927 
Netherlands 2,59 1436 1,357 Kosovo 3,86 1535 1,475 
Sweden 2,79 1382 1,026 Estonia 3,89 1439 ,800 
Spain 2,86 1498 1,482 Belarus 3,92 1386 1,207 
Denmark 2,92 1485 1,036 Albania 3,94 1460 ,963 
Belgium 
3,03 1346 1,057 
Northern 
Cyprus 
3,94 1524 1,166 
Norway 3,09 1363 1,221 Italy 4,00 1082 1,553 
Finland 3,11 1479 ,981 Moldova 4,02 1466 ,989 
Luxembourg 
3,11 945 1,050 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
4,04 1480 1,154 
Great Britain 3,20 456 1,111 Macedonia 4,05 1400 1,204 
Czech Republic 3,24 1726 1,203 Croatia 4,07 1262 1,188 
France 3,28 1453 1,414 Latvia 4,08 1469 ,993 
Germany 3,30 1456 1,088 Montenegro 4,09 1362 1,059 
Ireland 3,32 1052 1,422 Armenia 4,10 1320 1,113 
Northern Ireland 3,33 1478 1,459 Malta 4,11 1449 1,422 
Austria 3,40 1373 ,818 Lithuania 4,12 1063 1,431 
Switzerland 3,42 1950 1,342 Ukraine 4,16 1208 1,339 
Turkey 3,51 1462 ,919 Poland 4,20 2078 1,341 
Bulgaria 3,73 1486 1,213 Slovakia 4,23 1294 1,166 
Slovenia 3,79 788 ,964 Serbia 4,24 1428 1,120 
Russian 
Federation 
3,81 894 1,235 
Greece 
4,33 1464 1,214 
Portugal 3,82 1457 1,042 Cyprus 4,35 456 1,232 
Hungary 3,82 1405 1,022 Georgia 4,55 1547 1,062 
    Total 3,68 62177 1,288 
        
 
We conducted a simple cross-country descriptive statistics analysis which revealed certain 
trends in ATH in different countries. In general, our expectations and predictions from the literature 
review were confirmed. Some notable exceptions and peculiar cases were highlighted, however. 
They will be investigated further during regression analysis and, if the mystery would not be 
resolved, they will remain questions to explore in the future researches. 
Figures 1 - 3 which repeat the information in Tables 1 - 3 are presented in the Appendix. 
 
6.2. Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
In this section, we will run regression model only for the first dependent variable – 
―Justifiable: Homosexuality‖ (let us call it from this point ―Homonegativity Index‖). Then, the 
results for two other dependent variables for cross-check will be presented too. Let us start from 
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correlation analysis between our homonegativity index and main independent variables of interest. 
These variables are: ―Confidence: Churches‖ (we will call it ―Confidence in Churches‖), ―How 
often do you attend religious services?‖ (we will call it ―Religious Attendance‖) and ―Religious 
Person‖ (we will call it ―Religiosity Level‖). Below in the Table 4 correlations between 
homonegativity index and key explanatory variables are presented. 
 
Table 4. Correlations between major variables of interest* 
Variables Homonegativity 
Index 
Confidence to 
Churches 
Religious 
Attendance 
Religiosity Level 
Homonegativity Index 1    
Confidence to Churches 0.261 1   
Religious Attendance 0.233 0.479 1  
Religiosity Level 0.204 0.456 0.461 1 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
From Table 4, we could see that homonegativity index is moderately correlated with all of 
the key explanatory variables. Herewith, the correlation between homonegativity index and 
confidence to churches is the strongest (r = 0.261), following by religious attendance (r = 0.233), 
and only then by religiosity level (r = 0.204). Thus, our theoretical predictions from social 
psychology based on expertise heuristics that religious attendance and confidence in religious 
institutions might play more important role as predictors of homonegativity than general religiosity 
level, received first confirmation already from correlation analysis.  
Not surprisingly, our independent variables are highly correlated between each other. It is 
only natural to observe such a correlation since all of these variables are measures of personal 
religiosity with regard to its different aspects. However, because of these high correlation levels, we 
decided to include religious attendance and confidence in churches variables, which demonstrate 
the largest correlation between each other (r = 0.479), separately in our model. Thus, we will 
observe the effects of attendance and confidence variable in two separate models. The religiosity 
variable will be included in both of these models, however, despite its high correlation level with 
both of these variables as well. We need to observe the effect of both religiosity and confidence to 
churches, and religiosity and religious attendance, though. Otherwise our analysis loses its sense.  
Before proceed to the regression analysis, let us present a brief summary of all our variables 
of interest, including controls, in table 5.  
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Table 5. Variable Information 
Variable Min. Max. Information 
Homonegativity Index 
1 10 
1 = “Never justifiable”, 
10 = “Always justifiable” 
Confidence in Churches 
1 4 
1 = “A great deal”, 
4 = “None at all” 
Religious Attendance 
1 8 
1 = “More than once a week”, 
8 = “Never practically never” 
Religiosity Level 
1 3 
1 = “A religious person”, 
2 = “Not a religious person”, 
3 = “A convinced atheist” 
Sex 
1 2 
1 = “Male”, 
2 = “Female” 
Age  
1 6 
1 = “15 – 24 years”, 
6 = “65 and more years” 
Marital Status 
0 1 
0 = “Not legally married to a partner”, 
1 = “Legally married to a partner” 
Number of Children 
0 8 
0 = “No children”, 
8 = “8 and more children” 
Educational Level 
1 8 
1 = “No completed education”, 
8 = “University degree” 
Socio-economic Status  
1 4 
1 = “Upper class”, 
4 = “Unskilled manual workers” 
Income Level 
1 3 
1 = “Low”, 
3 = “High” 
 
Finally, let us move to individual level regression analysis. We will run four multiple linear 
regression models for this variable. As was argued in theoretical section, even if our dependent 
variable is ordinal, it is possible to use linear regression since the number of its categories is far 
larger than five (ten in our case). First, we will observe the ―pure‖ effects of our religious 
variables, religious attendance and confidence to churches, separately along with religiosity level 
variable, and then we will add control variables. Finally, we will compare results of all models and 
conclude. Results for the homonegativity index variable are presented in Table 6. Results for other 
two dependent variables could be seen in Appendix. 
 
Table 6. Individual-level predictors of homonegativity in the world* 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE 
(Intercept) 1,089 ,0131 2,585 ,2702 1,453 ,0127 2,862 ,2600 
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Confidence to 
Churches 
,660 ,0053 ,532 ,0358 
    
Religiosity Level ,609 ,0102 ,486 ,0630 ,689 ,0103 ,364 ,0636 
Religious Attendance     ,219 ,0021 ,247 ,0136 
Sex 
  
,700 ,0608 
  
,648 ,0601 
Age 
  
-,083 ,0230 
  
-,086 ,0228 
Marital Status 
  
-,903 ,1034 
  
-,840 ,1019 
Number of Children 
  
-,166 ,0223 
  
-,167 ,0222 
Educational Level 
  
,199 ,0174 
  
,210 ,0172 
Socio-Economic Class 
  
-,425 ,0395 
  
-,422 ,0388 
Income Level 
  
,161 ,0447 
  
,153 ,0443 
*All coefficients are significant with p < 0.01. 
 
Our regression results are somewhat interesting. In the Model 1, we discovered that 
confidence in churches contributes to homonegativity more than religiosity level. This effect does 
not disappear after introducing all control variables in our model. Confidence in churches 
coefficient became a bit smaller after including controls in the Model 2, but it is still big enough and 
significant, and its impact on our dependent variable is still greater than of general religiosity level. 
Thus, we could claim that confidence in churches and religious institutions contributes to 
homonegativity more than religiosity in general, and that expertise heuristics effects matters. Thus, 
our Hypothesis 5 is supported by empirical results.  
Speaking of control variables, all our predictions are confirmed either, though to different 
extent. Thus, female gender, younger age, single marital status, fewer number of children, higher 
educational level, upper social class and higher income level contribute to more accepting attitudes 
towards homosexuality. However, their impact is somewhat different. Thus, gender, marital status 
and socio-economic class have greater impact on homonegativity than all other control variables. 
For gender and marital status, the effect is larger than even for our religious variables. Age has the 
least impact on our dependent variable. It is worth to note that we tried to use first different variable 
for age which was decoded into three categories (just young, middle-aged and old) instead of six 
categories, but this variable turned out to be insignificant in our model. When we replaced it by new 
age variable with six categories, its effect was significant but small. Educational and income levels 
also had lesser impact than it was expected. The effect of socio-economic class is large enough, 
though. Let us say some more about this variable. Thus, socio-economic status in our analysis 
represents not only social class (upper, middle and low), but also type of labor force (manual and 
non-manual). It was argued by some abovementioned researchers that lower social class and manual 
type of labor contribute to more homonegativity level. This argument stemmed from Inglehart‘s 
ideas about role of economic development and survival values (e.g., people with lower income and 
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manual workers tend to express more survival than self-expression values, thus contributing to 
greater homonegativity). Both of these propositions were confirmed in our model. Thus, manual 
unskilled workers turned out to be the most homonegative whereas the upper class and non-manual 
workers – the least ones.  
When we performed analysis for religiosity level and religious attendance, the results were 
somewhat different. In Model 3, both variables turned out to be significant but the impact of 
religiosity level thrice greater than of religious attendance, unlike with confidence to churches 
variable. Thus, our Hypothesis 4 also received support though only partially: religious attendance 
does contribute to homonegativity, but to lesser extent than general religiosity.  
After introducing controls in Model 4, both our religious variables remained significant but 
their impact had changed however. Thus, the effect of religiosity level dropped almost twice (from 
0.689 to 0.364), though the effect of religious attendance became somewhat a bit stronger, in the 
contrary (regression coefficient has increased from 0.219 to 0.247). However, combined effect of 
religiosity and religious attendance on homonegativity level is smaller than of religiosity and 
confidence to churches. Thus, we could conclude that confidence in churches has the largest impact 
on our dependent variable among all religious variables, and contributes the most to 
homonegativity. Thus, it is not enough to be religious to express homonegative views. You have to 
trust what priests and imams say about homosexuals to have the most homonegative attitudes.  
Speaking of control variables in Model 4, their effect is similar to the one in Model 2. 
Almost all coefficients became a bit smaller, but in general their signs and values did not change.   
From our individual-level regression analysis we could conclude that all our theoretical 
predictions were supported. Both our hypotheses were also confirmed though Hypothesis 4 (H4: 
More frequently a particular person attends religious services, more homonegative this person is) 
received only partial confirmation: religious attendance does contribute to homonegativity but to 
lesser extent than religiosity level. To cross-check these results for other two dependent variables, 
see the Appendix.  
 
Table 7. Individual level predictors of social distance towards homosexuals* 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE 
(Intercept) -,667 ,0093 -,658 ,1973 -,565 ,1941 -,491** ,0086 
Confidence to 
Churches 
,241 ,0036 ,258 ,0264 
    
Religiosity Level ,207 ,0065 ,359 ,0481 ,071 ,0014 ,248 ,0492 
Religious Attendance     ,237 ,0066 ,138 ,0103 
Sex 
  
,369 ,0444 
  
,342 ,0442 
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Age 
  
,089 ,0172 
  
,095 ,0173 
Marital Status 
  
-,484 ,0820 
  
-,437 ,0814 
Number of Children 
  
-,163 ,0172 
  
-,166 ,0171 
Educational Level 
  
,095 ,0127 
  
,105 ,0128 
Socio-Economic Class 
  
-,210 ,0285 
  
-,211 ,0285 
Income Level 
  
,153 ,0325 
  
,143 ,0324 
*All coefficients except (**) are significant with p < 0.01. 
** Significant with p < 0.05. 
 
Table 8. Individual Level Predictors of Attitudes towards Child Adoption by Homosexual 
Couples* 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
B  SE B  SE B  SE B  SE 
Threshold = “1” 
-3,703 ,0281 -3,901 ,0582 
-
3,654 
,0266 -3,910 ,0575 
= ”2” 
-2,350 ,0244 -2,553 ,0556 
-
2,300 
,0228 -2,560 ,0549 
= ”3” 
-1,644 ,0232 -1,841 ,0550 
-
1,593 
,0217 -1,850 ,0543 
= ”4” -,445 ,0221 -,628 ,0545 -,394 ,0207 -,637 ,0538 
Confidence to 
Churches 
-,234 ,0092 -,228 ,0102  
 
  
Religiosity Level 
-,412 ,0161 -,420 ,0178 -,381 ,0159 -,389 ,0176 
Religious Attendance   
  -,107 ,0036 -,105 ,0041 
Sex   
-,314 ,0171 ,0053 
 
-,316 ,0170 
Age   
,128 ,0053 ,0048 
 
,125 ,0053 
Educational Level   
-,043 ,0048 ,0112 
 
-,043 ,0047 
Income Level   
,025** ,0112 
  
,008*** ,0111 
*All coefficients except (**) and (***) are significant with p < 0.01. 
** Significant with p < 0.05. 
*** Insignificant with p = 0.452. 
 
6.3. The role of religious denomination in shaping ATH 
 
It was suggested by previous research in literature review that religious denomination 
matters when we speak of ATH, not only personal religiosity. In particular, the results of previous 
research suggest that Muslim religious denomination is the most homonegative one, while 
Buddhist, Hindu and Protestant denominations are somewhat more tolerant towards homosexuality 
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(Adamczyk and Pitt (2009), Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015)). There were also some discrepancies 
in their results. Thus, Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) claimed that only Muslim religious denomination 
has a stronger negative effect on ATH, while the differences between other denominations with 
regard to ATH are not so significant. In the contrary, Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) discovered 
that Muslim religious denomination is the most homonegative one indeed, but the difference 
between other religious denominations matters as well. Thus, their findings demonstrated that 
Protestants are more tolerant than Catholics and Orthodox Christians, but less tolerant than 
Buddhists and Hindu.  
We did not include religious denomination yet in our analysis but were focused more on 
personal religiosity and its interaction with confidence in churches and religious attendance. Now it 
is time to include the religious denomination variable in our analysis. The original variable 
―Religious Denomination‖ in World Values Survey is an ordinal variable which contains more than 
90 different categories of religious denominations. Therefore, it was decided to recode this variable 
to make it more suitable for our analysis. Thus, we excluded from our analysis the denominations 
which had too few followers (to be precise, we excluded categories for which the percentage of 
respondents was less than 1% from all respondents for this question). It was also possible to merge 
some denominations which were separated into different categories, into one (for example, we 
merged Sunni and Shia denominations with more general, Muslim denomination). Eventually, we 
created a new variable which contains only eight major religious denominations: Muslim, 
Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Hindu, Judaism, Independent Christian and Buddhism. Six of those 
denominations were already used in Jäckle and Wenzelburger paper but we added Judaism and 
Independent Christian Churches into our analysis (by independent churches we mean free, 
independent churches which officially do not belong to any major Christian denomination, for 
example Independent African Church). Independent churches may as well borrow many features 
from traditional Christian denominations but they are not defined by these denominations. Thus, so-
called Free Churches are separated from established, ―official‖ churches (for example, Free Church 
of England is separated from the established Church of England). Other independent churches, like 
African Independent Church, include elements of African traditional pagan beliefs and rites into 
their Christian modes of worship. It was considered a good idea to observe whether there is any 
difference in ATH between conventional and independent churches therefore.  
Based on this recoded Religious Denomination variable, we conducted three types of 
analysis. Firstly, we compared means of Religious Denomination and all three of our dependent 
homonegativity variables. Secondly, we investigated, how Religious Denomination variable is 
related to our other religious independent variables, e.g., Confidence in Churches, Religious 
Attendance and Religiosity level. Lastly, we created eight dummy variables based on Religious 
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Denomination variable, and included them into our regression analysis to observe which additional 
effect they have on our dependent variables.  
 
6.3.1. Religious Denomination and Homosexuality Acceptance: Descriptive Analysis 
 
Tables 9-11 demonstrate the results of descriptive statistics analysis (comparing means) of 
our dependent variables split by religious denominations.  
 
Table 9. Justifiable: Homosexuality and Religious Denomination 
Religious 
Denomination Mean N Std. Deviation 
Buddhist 3,09 10369 2,520 
Hindu 2,45 8668 2,575 
Independent Christian 3,62 4140 3,137 
Judaist 4,23 2800 3,477 
Muslim 1,63 61134 1,688 
Orthodox 2,21 53880 2,250 
Protestant 4,00 67742 3,408 
Catholic 3,65 130414 3,110 
 
Table 9 presents results for our main variable of interest – homonegativity index, named as 
Justifiable: Homosexuality in WVS. Our main theoretical prediction derived from the literature 
review that Muslim religious denomination is the most homonegative one received an 
overwhelming support by these results – Muslims with their score of 1.63 (close to 1, ―Never 
Justifiable‖) are indeed the most homonegative ones here. They are followed by the Orthodox with 
the score of 2.21 which, again, supported theoretical predictions and then, surprisingly, by Hindu 
with its score of 2.45. The last result is somewhat surprising as literature review suggested Hindu as 
one of relatively tolerant religion denominations. However, the results that we received might 
explain the case of India when homosexuality remains illegal after more than fifty years of 
democracy. We need regression results about Hindu to confirm this hypothesis however.  
Protestantism with its score of 4 and Judaism with its score of 4.23 turned out to be the most 
tolerant religious denomination however. Results for Protestantism are in accordance with previous 
research but results for Judaism are surprising again since Judaism as one of monotheistic religions 
originally was strongly opposed to homosexuality. We might speculate that Judaism was 
developing and changing over centuries and modern Judaism could be relatively more progressive 
in general and more tolerant towards homosexuals in particular than original, ancient Judaism. 
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These results received additional support from relatively high tolerant score of Israel on our scale of 
homonegativity in previous analysis (4.89).  
Buddhism, Catholicism and Independent Christian are somewhere in the middle on our 
homonegativity scale, with two Christian denominations more tolerant than Buddhism which is 
again surprising result because in its foundations Buddhism is relatively neutral to homosexuality 
compared to Christianity. Again, these results could be attributed to a significant change of 
Christian denominations over time (in particular, Catholic church in the West changed a lot during 
last time and even Pope Francis is relatively more tolerant towards homosexuality compared to 
previous Pope). In addition, these results somehow disapproved Jäckle and Wenzelburger results 
who claimed Christian denominations to be less tolerant than Buddhism and Hindu. One reason for 
this could be that we also used the last WVS wave in our analysis which was not available while 
they conducted their research.  
 
Table 10. Neighbors: Homosexuals and Religious Denomination 
Religious Denomination Mean N Std. Deviation 
Buddhist ,45 7758 ,498 
Hindu ,56 9799 ,497 
Independent Christian ,38 3876 ,485 
Judaist ,49 1691 ,500 
Muslim ,70 68721 ,456 
Orthodox ,64 56772 ,479 
Protestant ,35 58330 ,478 
Catholic ,38 122387 ,485 
 
Results for this variable in general support previous ones. Thus, Muslim religious 
denomination is again turned out to be the most homonegative one with its score of 0.70 (with 1 as 
―Don‘t want to have homosexual as neighbors‖), followed by Orthodox with its score of 0.64 and, 
again, Hindu with score of 0.56. Protestants are again the leaders of tolerance with score of 0.35, 
followed by Catholics with 0.38 and Independent Christian Churches with 0.38. Judaists, in the 
contrary to results for previous variable, are in the middle with score 0.49, along with Buddhist with 
score of 0.45. These results highlighted two important issues. First one is that Christian religion 
denominations, with an exception of Orthodox Christianity, nowadays are the most tolerant ones in 
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terms of social distance towards homosexuals. This could be attributed to the fact that most of those 
Christian denominations functioned in the West where homosexuality was legally acknowledged 
and gay people could live openly in public. That might affect ATH of those Christians, at least in 
terms of social distance towards homosexuals. This could also explain relatively less tolerance of 
Hindu and Buddhism which were historically more tolerant towards homosexuality than 
Christianity, but, because nowadays Asian societies where these religions function, still do not 
recognize gay rights legally and homosexuals are not open in public, that might affect attitudes of 
members of those religious denominations in a negative way. Other important issue here is that, 
again, results for homonegativity index in general and for social distance towards homosexuals in 
particular are somewhat different (for example, different score of Judaism for those two variables).  
 
Table 11. Homosexual Couples: Adopt Children and Religious Denomination 
Religious Denomination Mean N Std. Deviation 
Buddhist 3,03 35 1,424 
Hindu 3,66 29 1,045 
Independent Christian 3,18 274 1,354 
Judaist 3,47 64 1,414 
Muslim 3,82 5826 1,205 
Orthodox 4,12 14522 1,089 
Protestant 3,15 7072 1,395 
Catholic 3,78 17790 1,214 
 
Interpreting results for the last dependent variable, we should bear in mind, that they came 
only from European countries and, therefore, we could not have somewhat reliable results here for 
Muslims, Hindu, Judaists and Buddhists (Turkey, Northern Cyprus and some Balkan countries are 
basically the only Muslim countries presented there, and no Buddhist country and also no Judaist 
and Hindu country since the only Hindu country is India and only Judaist country is Israel and they 
are not European ones). However, we could still have valuable results for all Christian 
denominations from Europe and also it is somewhat interesting to observe how results for other 
religious denominations are different from previous two analyses. We could speculate that these last 
results for other religious denominations came probably from some Hindu or Buddhists who lives 
in Europe, from immigrants. For Muslim religious denomination, results come both from Muslim 
immigrants in Europe and from few Muslim countries that presented in EVS data.  
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Because Muslim countries are underrepresented for this variable, the new leaders in terms of 
intolerance are Orthodox with their score of 4.12 (with 5 as maximum homonegative score for this 
variable, as total disagreement with the idea of child adoption by homosexual couples). Muslims 
with score of 3.82 and Catholics with score of 3.79 followed. It is interesting that Catholics, who 
were somewhat in the middle on homonegativity scale and were one of three tolerance leaders for 
social distance towards homosexuals, are one of three leaders of intolerance for this variable. It 
might indicate that Catholics nowadays have somewhat ambiguous ATH. For instance, they do not 
mind to socialize with homosexuals but still are strongly opposed to the idea of child adoption by 
homosexual couples. Highest score for child adoption is received by Buddhists with score of 3.03, 
Protestants with score of 3.15 and Independent Christians with score of 3.18. Here we could 
observe two tendencies. Firstly, Protestants, unlike Catholics, demonstrate somewhat unambiguous 
tolerant ATH with regard to all three variables which confirms our theoretical predictions about 
them. Secondly, European Buddhists turned out to be more tolerant than Buddhists in general, 
according to these last results. That could be explained by combined effect of relative neutrality of 
Buddhism as religion towards homosexuality and with open presence of homosexuals in public in 
European societies, compared to their absence in Asian ones which could contribute to relative less 
tolerance of Buddhists in general. However, in general score for this last variable is more negative 
than for previous two, since even the most progressive Buddhists are ranked with 3.03, which is in 
the middle of the scale indicating ―I don‘t know whether homosexual couples should adopt children 
or not‖. Thus, even the most tolerant respondents do not fully agree with the idea of child adoption 
by homosexuals, they are just not against it. These results are in accordance with our cross-country 
analysis and somewhat important for our analysis.  
 
6.3.2. Interaction between Religious Denomination and other religious variables 
 
The next aspect of our analysis is the interaction between religious denominations and our 
other independent religious variables – religiosity level, confidence in churches and religious 
attendance. We already discovered in previous parts of our analysis that not only stronger personal 
religiosity, but greater confidence in churches and more frequent religious attendance contribute to 
more homonegative attitudes, thus implying expertise heuristics effect. Findings from the last part 
of our research suggested that Muslim and Orthodox religious denominations are the most 
homonegative ones, with respect to all our three dependent variable. Could we expect then that 
levels of confidences in churches and religious attendance are higher among these two 
denominations, which could contribute to their stronger homonegativity?  
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There are two more statements to be tested then: 
 
S1: Muslims have strongest confidence in churches relative to other religious denominations 
which contributes to their highest homonegativity level 
 
S2: Muslims have the most frequent religious attendance level relative to other religious 
denominations which contributes to their highest homonegativity level 
 
Tables 12-13 demonstrate levels of confidence in churches and religious attendance split by 
religious denominations.  
 
Table 12. Confidence in Churches and Religious Denomination 
Religious Denomination Mean N Std. Deviation 
Buddhist 2,48 10189 ,929 
Hindu 1,81 9321 ,933 
Independent Christian 1,86 4264 ,911 
Judaist 2,22 1867 ,918 
Muslim 1,80 74882 ,936 
Orthodox 1,94 55978 ,883 
Protestant 2,07 68786 ,898 
Catholic 2,03 137498 ,911 
 
These results somewhat support our previous two statements. Muslims turned out to have 
the greatest confidence in churches with their score of 1.80 (as we remember, ―1‖ signifies the 
highest level of confidence and ―4‖ the lowest for this variable). However, level of confidence for 
Muslims is not so much different from levels of other denominations as we could observe. Hindu 
have almost the same level of confidence raked with 1.81 and then Independent Christians followed 
with their score of 1.86. Hindu were ranked poorly on the scale of homonegativity for all three 
dependent variables so these results support our predictions too but Independent Christians were 
somewhat more tolerant on homonegativity scale so it seems that their confidence to their churches 
does not affect much their ATH. Same goes to Catholics and Protestants who have somewhat 
average confidence to religious institutions ranked with 2.03 and 2.07 respectively. Judaists and 
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Buddhists are the least confident to their religious institutions religious denominations with scores 
of 2.22 and 2.48 respectively which somehow reflects their relative tolerance towards 
homosexuality in previous analysis.  
These findings suggest two important issues for our analysis. Firstly, our predictions for the 
most of religious denominations are supported. Thus, members of the most homonegative 
denominations – Muslims, Orthodox and Hindu – also have the greater levels of confidence to their 
churches. Buddhists and Judaists who turned out to be relatively tolerant towards homosexuality 
have lesser confidence in churches either. The discrepancies in results affect only Western Christian 
denominations – Catholics, Protestants and Independent Christians. They have relatively strong or 
somewhat average confidence in churches and religious institutions but they also have more neutral 
or tolerant views towards homosexuals. How could we explain these somewhat surprising findings? 
An important issue that most of those Christian religious denominations operate nowadays in the 
Western world – in Europe and both Americas where homosexuality is already more or less 
accepted by the societies and gay rights are recognized legally. This issue could affect also values 
and attitudes of religious believers of those denominations. There could be two possible ways to 
explain it. Firstly, Protestant, Catholic and Independent Christian churches might still preach 
against homosexuals and religious believers might still have some degree of confidence in their 
preaches, as our results suggested. However, people in the West might have confidence in other 
issues as well – in science or liberal ideology, for example. If scientists or liberal politicians claim 
something opposite to what churches and religious leaders are saying, for example, about 
homosexuality, it might affect opinions and attitudes of religious believers too if they have at least 
some confidence in science or liberal ideology. Thus, if church claims that homosexuality is a sin, 
but science tells that it is actually human nature which we cannot choose or change, and human 
rights activists add to the public discourse the importance of protecting of gay rights against 
discrimination, public opinion would be somewhat divided on that issue even among the religious 
believers. In addition, religious leaders have less freedom in their homonegative speeches in the 
West compared to Middle East for example. If they would call homosexuals to death, for instance, 
the might be judged for hate speech. In the Middle East, however, religious leaders are free to call 
homosexuals to death since in some of those countries it is actually legal to kill homosexuals. 
Therefore, the effect of homonegative speeches by religious leaders in the countries where gay 
rights are not recognized and not protected might be somewhat stronger than in societies where gay 
rights are protected. In addition, Western Christian churches are also changing over time. Thus, 
even Catholic Pope Francis is relatively more tolerant towards homosexuals than previous Popes, 
and some Protestant churches even allowed some services for homosexuals inside the church. There 
is not an issue for Orthodox and Muslim churches, however. Therefore, we could argue that in 
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general the effect of confidence in churches on ATH is negative but it is somewhat different and 
nonlinear for different religious denominations. This effect is stronger for Muslims, Hindu, 
Orthodox, Judaists and Buddhists and somewhat softer and more controversial for Western 
Christian denominations.  
 
Table 13. Religious Attendance and Religious Denomination 
Religious Denomination Mean N Std. Deviation 
Buddhist 4,40 10882 2,126 
Hindu 3,39 9735 2,041 
Independent Christian 3,29 4285 2,314 
Judaist 4,58 1880 2,453 
Muslim 3,94 75807 2,692 
Orthodox 4,42 56941 1,942 
Protestant 4,40 68512 2,590 
Catholic 3,80 137669 2,291 
 
To interpret these results we need to know that religious attendance variable is ranked from 
1 to 8, from the most frequent to the least frequent level. Our findings, however, are not so 
informative in this case as in case of previous variables. All religious denominations are scored 
somewhere in the middle of frequency of attendance level, around 4, and there is no significant 
differences between different religious denominations. Independent Christians, Hindu, Catholics 
and Muslims are more frequent attendants since all of them are ranked below 4, and Buddhists, 
Protestants, Orthodox and Judaists are less frequent attendants of religious services. There is no 
clear connection between religious attendance and homonegativity with this regard, however. Thus, 
Independent Christians are the most frequent religious attendants but they are relatively tolerant 
towards homosexuals. In the contrary, Orthodox Christians are the second least frequent religious 
attendants but they are the second most homonegative religious denomination. Theoretical 
predictions are though confirmed for some religious denominations like Protestants and Judaists are 
not so frequent attendants and the most tolerant towards homosexuals, while Muslims and Hindus 
are more frequent attendants and the least tolerant ones. However, the difference in attendance 
between different religion denominations is not so great and significant, somewhat arbitrary and we 
could not rely on these findings in our analysis as we could do for the previous variable – 
confidence in churches.  
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6.3.3. Religious Denomination: Regression Analysis with Dummy Variables 
 
Descriptive analysis demonstrated general tendencies and correlations between different 
religious denominations and our variables of interest. To understand their effect on our dependent 
variables fully, we need to conduct regression analysis, including religious denomination in our 
analysis as a set of dummy variables.  
First, we created a set of eight dummy variables from our recoded ―Religious 
Denomination‖ variable. These dummy variables are: Muslim, Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, 
Hindu, Buddhist, Independent Christian. We used the ninth variable ―Other‖ as a reference category 
(in the variable ―Other‖ were included other religious denominations which were excluded from the 
main analysis because of the small number of respondents, or because of their relative irrelevance to 
the major religious denominations in the world like Zionists or Zoroastrians, for instance). We 
decided to choose excluded category as a reference since we were interested to observe the effect of 
all major religious denominations of interest on our dependent variable and didn‘t want to exclude 
any of them from the regression analysis.  
All other religious independent variables and all controls that we used in our previous 
regression analysis were included into this analysis as well. The only difference is that we included 
set of dummy variables with religious denominations in addition. Results for the first variable, 
―Homonegativity Index‖, are presented in the table 14.  
 
Table 14. Individual-level predictors of homonegativity in the world: the effect of 
Religious Denomination 
Parameter 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
B SE B SE B SE B SE 
(Intercept) 1,656 ,0214 3,179 ,3060 1,920 ,0212 3,294 ,2959 
Confidence in 
Churches 
,579 ,0053 ,494 ,0363 
    
Religiosity Level ,516 ,0105 ,354 ,0676 ,544 ,0106 ,301 ,0675 
Religious Attendance     ,214 ,0021 ,230 ,0141 
Protestant ,478 ,0177 ,891 ,1204 ,507 ,0179 ,814 ,1173 
Muslim -1,683 ,0144 -2,428 ,1104 -1,741 ,0147 -2,360 ,1114 
Catholic ,221 ,0150 -,231** ,0954 ,311 ,0154 -,065* ,0961 
Orthodox -1,171 ,0159 -,198* ,4875 -1,290 ,0160 -,082* ,4677 
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Hindu -,911 ,0317 2,290 ,1739 -,869 ,0315 3,260 ,1433 
Judaist ,030* ,0760 -,546* ,9167 ,044* ,0780 -,240* ,8456 
Independent Christian ,253 ,0501 -,745** ,3115 ,347 ,0503 -,560** ,3087 
Buddhist -,683 ,0298 4,232 ,1324 -,503 ,0296 5,636 ,5967 
Sex   ,668 ,0617   ,624 ,0611 
Age   -,356 ,0507   -,362 ,0502 
Marital Status   -,700 ,1037   -,656 ,1026 
Number of Children   -,077** ,0226   -,076** ,0224 
Educational Level   ,193 ,0170   ,202 ,0168 
Employment Status   -,011* ,0169   -,015* ,0168 
Income Level   ,128** ,0450   ,116** ,0446 
Socio-Economic Status   -,334 ,0391   -,334 ,0386 
All coefficients, except (*) and (**), are significant at p =0.00. 
(*) = coefficients are insignificant. 
(**) = coefficients are significant at p < 0.05. 
 
The analysis was conducted in the same manner as previous one. First, in Models 1 and 3 we 
isolated the effects of religious variables including religious denomination dummies, on our 
dependent variable, and in Models 2 and 4 we included all our controls. The difference between 
Models 1 and 3 is that in Model 1 we included the measure of confidence in churches and in Model 
3 – measure of religious attendance. Same difference is between Models 2 and 4. Religious 
denomination dummies are included in all the models.  
Results supported our predictions. Muslims are the most homonegative religious 
denomination in all four models, coefficient for them is significant in all models and the negative 
effect is strongest among all other predictors. In addition, the inclusion of controls  strengthens the 
power of homonegativity of Muslims (for instance, from -1,683 in Model 1 to -2,428 in Model 2). 
Homonegative effect of Muslims is about three times stronger than of other religious variables 
(confidence in churches and religious person) in Model 1, and about six times stronger in Model 2. 
When confidence in churches is replaced by religious attendance, homonegative effect of Muslims 
became even stronger.  
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Situation with other religious denominations is somewhat more complex. In Models 1 and 3, 
without controls, Orthodox, Hindu and Buddhists also have negative effect on our variable of 
interest, though less strong than Muslims, but Western Christian denominations (e.g., Catholics, 
Protestants, Independent Christians) and Judaists have a positive effect on our dependent variable 
(the effect of Judaism is insignificant in all models, however, so we can exclude Judaists from our 
analysis). We could explain these results by the fact that in the absence of control variables, 
relatively more tolerant religious denominations (like Western Christian ones) seemed to play 
positive effect compared to the more homonegative religious denominations.  
The inclusion of controls changed the situation however. Muslims still remain the most 
homonegative religious denomination and the strongest predictor of homonegativity in all four 
models, as was said above. Protestants also remain the most positive to homosexuality religious 
denomination in all four models and their effect is relatively strong and significant. Results for other 
religious denominations are somewhat changed after controls were added, however. Thus, 
Catholics, Judaists and Independent Christians already play negative role in shaping ATH after 
inclusion of controls, though coefficients for Judaists are insignificant and coefficients for Catholics 
and Independent Christians are significant only at p < 0.1 (and coefficient for Catholics in Model 4 
is significant). Orthodox remain homonegative after inclusion of controls, but their effect became 
less strong (for example, from -1,171 in Model 1 to -0,198 in Model 2) and insignificant. Even 
more interesting metamorphoses affect Buddhists and Hindu whose coefficients remain significant 
but change their sigh from negative to positive, and strongly positive (for example, from -,683 in 
Model 1 to 4,232 in Model 2 for Buddhism). These results may suggest that, though the effect of 
Buddhism and Hindu is general is negative, in the presence of other factors which influence 
homonegativity, it might become somewhat more positive. However, these results for Buddhists 
and Hindu are still somewhat controversial.  
The most reliable findings from this analysis are about Muslims as the most homonegative 
and Protestants as the most tolerant to homosexuals religious denominations. Orthodox are 
homonegative in all the models but their effect became insignificant after inclusion of controls, and 
the effect of Judaism is insignificant in all models. As for other four religious denominations 
(Catholics, Independent Christians, Buddhists and Hindu), results for them are somewhat on the 
border of significance and controversial since their effect changed after inclusion of controls to the 
opposite. However, we can claim that our results for Muslims and Protestants confirmed our 
theoretical predictions and findings from previous research.  
Among controls, the effects remained the same as in previous analysis: female gender, 
younger age, single marital status, smaller number of children, higher educational and income levels 
contribute to less homonegativity. The effect of employment status is insignificant, but for socio-
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economic class results are also the same as in previous part of analysis – manual workers tend to be 
more homonegative than non-manual workers, and upper social classes are less homonegative than 
lower ones. 
We conducted the same analysis for the second dependent variable – ―Neighbors: 
Homosexuals‖ – with religious denomination dummy variables. For this variable, coefficients 
turned out to be insignificant for most of the religious denominations. However, effects of Muslims 
and Protestants are still strong and significant, and Muslims are again the most homonegative 
religious denomination and Protestants – the most positive to homosexuals religious denomination. 
In addition, Catholics have homonegative, but less strong effect. For controls, effects are also the 
same, except for the income level. Higher income contributes to greater social distance from 
homosexuals in this analysis. Age, marital status and employment status turned out to be 
insignificant. However, the same results for the second variable we obtained in previous analysis, 
without religious denominations. In addition, for the Model 2 here below the coefficient for the 
religiosity level is also insignificant, and coefficients for religious attendance and for Catholics are 
significant at p < 0.05. Here below in Table 15 the results for the second dependent variable are 
presented. We decided to run only two models for this variable since in the case of most of religious 
denomination dummies turned out to be insignificant, there is no sense to waste time on observing 
their separate effect without controls.  
 
Table 15. Individual level predictors of social distance towards homosexuals 
Parameter 
Model 1 Model 2 
B SE B SE 
(Intercept) ,003 ,2392 -,120 ,2356 
Confidence in Churches ,236 ,0291   
Religiosity Level ,186 ,0534 ,099* ,0545 
Religious Attendance   ,145** ,0117 
Protestant ,582 ,1062 ,563 ,1054 
Muslim -3,130 ,1384 -3,087 ,1391 
Catholic -,311 ,0711 -,159** ,0737 
Orthodox ,375* ,4224 ,489* ,4196 
Hindu 23,283* 32,2377 23,896* 28,0682 
Judaist ,024* ,6211 ,155* ,6060 
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Independent Christian -,223* ,2257 -,068* ,2246 
Buddhist 24,149* 40,8624 24,669* . 
Sex ,358 ,0490 ,357 ,0490 
Age -,084* ,0402 -,080* ,0402 
Marital Status -,192* ,0843 -,153* ,0843 
Number of Children -,085 ,0194 -,083 ,0194 
Educational Level ,084 ,0132 ,093 ,0133 
Employment Status -,006* ,0134 -,005* ,0133 
Income Level ,124 ,0355 ,109 ,0354 
Socio-Economic Status -,127 ,0299 -,133 ,0301 
All coefficients are significant at p < 0.01, except: 
(*) – insignificant 
(**) – significant at p < 0.05.  
 
We also conducted the same regression analysis with religious denomination dummy 
variables for our last dependent variable, ―Homosexual Couples: Adopt Children‖. We decided to 
keep only two models as for the second variable in this case either. Results are presented in Table 
16 below. Half of our controls turned out to be insignificant – only sex, age and educational level 
remained significant. Among the religious denomination, Hindu and Judaist coefficients are 
insignificant, and for the second model Buddhist coefficient became insignificant too. While 
interpreting results which are still significant, we should remember that coding of our dependent 
variable in this case is inverse, and, thus, coefficients with inverse signs compared to two previous 
variables, contribute to positive and negative ATH.  
Effect of religiosity, religious attendance and confidence in churches is significant and 
negative, as in the previous models. Among controls results also confirmed previous ones: female 
gender, younger age and higher educational level contribute to less homonegativity. Findings for 
religious denominations among significant ones are somewhat interesting. Muslims, Catholics and 
Orthodox have negative effect, though the most negative effect in this case is Orthodox one, not 
Muslim. We could explain these results if we remember that data for this variable came only from 
EVS, e.g., from European countries. Therefore, majority of Muslim countries excluded from this 
analysis. In two models below Muslim countries are represented only by Turkey, Northern Cyprus, 
Albania and Kosovo. Therefore, these results do not represent Muslims in general. In the absence of 
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majority of Muslim countries, it is not surprising that Orthodox became the most homonegative. 
Effects of Hindu, Judaists and Buddhists are insignificant (that could be explained by the fact that 
these religious might be underrepresented in European countries as well). Protestants and 
Independent Christians are the only religious denominations which have positive effects on this 
variable.  
 
Table 16. Individual Level Predictors of Attitudes towards Child Adoption by Homosexual 
Couples and Religious Denomination 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
B SE B SE 
Threshold = “1” 
-3,500 ,0699 -3,543 ,0694 
= ”2” -2,123 ,0679 -2,165 ,0675 
= ”3” -1,388 ,0674 -1,433 ,0670 
= ”4” -,137** ,0671 -,185 ,0666 
Confidence in Churches 
-,178 ,0107   
Religiosity Level 
-,316 ,0192 -,304 ,0189 
Religious Attendance   
-,082 ,0044 
Protestant -,600 ,0322 -,581 ,0316 
Muslim ,156 ,0353 ,157 ,0351 
Catholic ,142 ,0262 ,067** ,0269 
Orthodox ,723 ,0274 ,704 ,0273 
Hindu ,243* ,3074 ,128* ,3136 
Judaist -,167* ,3295 -,289* ,3126 
Independent Christian -,656 ,1234 -,732 ,1185 
Buddhist -,918** ,3822 -,742* ,4403 
Sex 
-,331 ,0172 -,331 ,0171 
Age 
,280 ,0116 ,278 ,0115 
Educational Level 
-,056 ,0049 -,057 ,0048 
All coefficients are significant at p < 0.01, except: 
(*) – insignificant 
(**) – significant at p < 0.05. 
 
We run several models for all three our dependent variables. Our findings for each variable 
are somewhat different and many predictors became insignificant in case of second and third 
dependent variables. However, two facts remain the same through all analysis. Muslim religious 
denomination always contributes to homonegativity and in case of first two variables it is the 
strongest predictor of homonegativity (it is not the case with the last variable only because Muslims 
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are underrepresented there). Protestant religious denomination, in the contrary, always contributes 
to positive ATH and in all cases is the most positive of all religious denominations. The coefficients 
for Muslims and Protestants are highly significant (p=0.00) and stable in all our models. Therefore, 
we could claim that not all religions contribute to homonegativity as it was considered in some 
previous research. Islam is the most homonegative of all religions indeed, but Protestantism is 
relatively tolerant and contributes to positive ATH.  
However, we just presented our regression results for now and didn‘t address the question 
why actually Islam turned out to be the most homonegative religious denomination and 
Protestantism the most tolerant one. There could be two possible theoretical explanations derived 
from our social psychology theoretical background and from our literature review. Firstly, it is an 
expertise heuristics effect, of course. We have demonstrated in our first regression models that 
confidence in churches as a measure of homonegativity has the greater effect on homonegativity 
than personal religiosity. Afterwards we demonstrated that Muslims who are the most 
homonegative among religious denominations also have greatest confidence in their religious 
institutions. Thus, their greater confidence in churches might contribute to their greater 
homonegativity level. In the contrary, Protestants tend to be relatively less confident in their 
religious institutions than other religious denominations. However, it is only one side of the coin. 
Second explanation could be derived from Inglehart‘s ideas about secular and traditional values. 
Thus, according to Inglehart, societies with secular, rational values tend to express less 
homonegativity levels than societies with traditional values shaped by religions. Western countries 
in general and Protestant ones in particular separated church from the state and established secular 
legislation while majority of Muslim countries still live under religious, ―sharia law‖. Thus may 
contribute to more traditional and homonegative values in those societies and to greater confidence 
in churches there either. Therefore, according to those explanations, we cannot expect changes to 
greater tolerance in Islamic societies until they separate state from the church and establish secular 
and not religious law. Thus, secularization of Muslim societies is recommended as one of the 
possible ways of value change. This idea received additional support from history. Thus, first 
decriminalization of homosexuality in the Islamic world happened in Ottoman Empire during 
Tanzimât secular reformation, as was stated in historical review. 
We considered also another explanation for these findings derived from Inglehart‘s theories. 
According to Inglehart, economic development could contribute to less homonegativity in a 
particular society. Thus, wealthy and affluent societies with self-expression values tend to be less 
homonegative, while poor societies with survival values, in the contrary, tend to express greater 
levels of homonegativity. There could be an explanation that Western Christian countries are less 
homonegative because they are wealthy and affluent while Middle Eastern and African Islamic 
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countries are relatively poor. However, this explanation does not hold truth for many cases. For 
example, Saudi Arabia is indeed wealthy and affluent country but it has a death sentence for 
homosexuals. Other Islamic countries from Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
are relatively wealthy either but not tolerant. Therefore, economic development cannot explain 
these cases but expertise heuristics effect could. Great confidence in religious institutions in Islamic 
societies and religious ―sharia law‖ tend to be a great obstacle on the way towards greater 
acceptance of homosexuality. Our prediction is until the secular reformation is made in those 
societies and ―sharia law‖ is left behind, we should not expect any positive changes in societal 
attitudes towards homosexuality. 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we conducted empirical statistical analysis to explore attitudes towards 
homosexuality (ATH) around the world. For this purpose, we used data from World Values Survey 
(WVS) and European Values Study (EVS) from more than 100 countries. Our dependent variables 
were those related to homosexuality and societal attitudes towards it: homonegativity level, social 
distance towards homosexuals and societal attitudes towards child adoption by homosexual couples.  
Our cross-country descriptive analysis demonstrated that Western countries (e.g., Europe, 
North and Latin America) and Israel tend to be more tolerant towards homosexuals, while Asian 
African and Eastern European countries tend to be less tolerant. Andorra turned out to be the least 
homonegative country and Egypt – the most homonegative one, for the first two of our dependent 
variables. Our findings for these two variables are in general concurred though there are some 
notable exceptions. Thus, some Muslim countries which were scored were poorly on the 
homonegativity scale, are ranked much higher in terms of social distance towards homosexuals, 
e.g., the respondents from those countries do not mind much to have homosexuals as neighbors (for 
instance, Bahrain, Pakistan and Bangladesh). Speaking about our last variable, the data from it came 
only from EVS and, therefore, mostly from European countries. Even if we could expect higher 
tolerance because of that, all the countries were scored relatively poorly, with the Western European 
countries to be more tolerant and Eastern European countries – less tolerant. However, the average 
score for this variable is closer to the negative one, thus, to the disapproval of child adoption by 
homosexual couples. Therefore, based on this analysis we could conclude that even in Europe 
homosexuality is still not fully accepted nowadays.  
Afterwards, we run three separate multiple regressions for each of our dependent variables. 
The independent variables of our main interest were the religious ones – religiosity level, 
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confidence in churches and religious attendance. The first one captured the effect of religion on 
ATH in general, while other two variables were used to test our main theoretical hypothesis derived 
from social psychology – expertise heuristics effect. In addition, we included into our regression 
models several control variables suggested by our literature review. Our results confirmed both our 
theoretical predictions and other researcher‘s statements. Thus, confidence in churches turned out to 
be significant predictor of homonegativity, which effect on ATH was stronger than one of 
religiosity level. Therefore, confidence in religious institutions matters and expertise heuristics 
effect works. Second measure of this effect, the frequency of religious attendance, was also 
significant, though its effect was somewhat smaller than of religiosity level. Speaking about our 
control variables, we could claim that female gender, younger age, single marital status, smaller 
number of children, higher educational level, upper social class and higher income level contribute 
to less homonegativity and higher tolerance. Those results are held for all three dependent variables. 
However, for the second variable, age started to play an opposite effect, e.g., older age contributed 
to less homonegativity in terms of social distance towards homosexuals. Speaking of the last 
variables, almost all of our controls lost our significance. Only age, sex and educational level 
remained significant predictors of acceptance of child adoption by homosexual couples. However, 
for our main, religious, variables effects are strong and coefficients are significant in all of our three 
models.  
Finally, we investigated the role of different religious denominations in shaping ATH. Our 
descriptive analysis suggested that Judaists, Protestants, Independent Christians (which do not 
belong to any official Christian denomination) and Catholics are the most tolerant religious 
denominations, while Muslims, Orthodox, Hindu and Buddhists are the least tolerant ones. Those 
results are somewhat surprising since Christianity, as monotheistic religion, is tend to be more 
homonegative, than Buddhism and Hindu which are more or less neutral to homosexuality, but our 
results suggested that Western Christian denominations (Protestants, Catholics and Independent 
Christians) are actually more tolerant. Our results are held for all three dependent variables with 
slight discrepancies. We could contribute these findings to the fact that Western Christian 
denominations nowadays are changing along with the Western societies towards greater tolerance 
while Buddhism and Hindu, even if originally more tolerant, now drag behind along with Asian 
more homonegative societies.  
Afterwards, we again run three regression models, including religious denomination as a set 
of dummy variables. Our findings for all three models suggest that Islam is the most homonegative 
religious denomination with the strongest negative effect on ATH (with the slight exception of the 
last model, where Muslim are the second homonegative ones after Orthodox, but this fact could be 
explained by the fact that data for the last variable came only from Europe which leaves out the 
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majority of Muslim countries while including the majority of Orthodox ones), while Protestantism 
is the most tolerant one. Effects for Muslims and Protestants are strong and significant for all three 
models. With other religious denominations, situation is somewhat more difficult. Judaism turned 
out to be insignificant in all three models, while Orthodox Christianity lost its significance after 
introduction of control variables. Buddhism, Hindu and Independent Christianity lost its 
significance in the last two models, while effect of Catholicism is different in each model. 
Therefore, we received reliable and significant regression results only for Muslims and Protestants.  
We could explain these results for religious denominations by our theoretical hypothesis – 
expertise heuristics effect. Thus, our descriptive analysis also demonstrated that Muslims tend to 
have greatest confidence in their religious institutions while Protestants have relatively less 
confidence in their churches. Therefore, we could argue, that confidence in authorities matters and 
one of the reasons of higher homonegativity of Muslims is their greater confidence in religious 
institutions. In addition, majority of Muslim countries still lives under religious, ―sharia‖ law, which 
could contribute to greater religiosity of those societies and their traditional values, shaped by 
Islam. According to Inglehart‘s concepts, traditional values contribute to greater homonegativity 
while secular values are related to greater tolerance towards homosexuality. Thus, our suggestion to 
improve situation in Muslim countries is their secularization. Until those societies live under 
religious law and have great confidence in their religious institutions, which preach against 
homosexuality on the regular basis, no possible value change could happen.  
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